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THE OPEN AND OBVIOUS DANGER DOCTRINE:
WHERE DOES IT BELONG IN OUR
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE REGIME?
I. INTRODUCTION
The open and obvious danger doctrine, available in situations in
which a plaintiff acts in a manner that disregards ordinary caution in the
face of a "known or obvious" danger,2 is standing on uncertain grounds
in Wisconsin. The doctrine originated from the common-law notion
that landowners have no duty to warn or protect invitees from open and
obvious dangers because: (1) "invitees are, in most circumstances,
expected to protect themselves from obvious dangers,, 3 and (2)
imposing liability for obvious dangers would unfairly burden
landowners by requiring them to inspect and improve their land.4 As a
result of this original rule, a voluntarily confrontation of an open and
obvious danger barred recovery for any injury that may have ensued as
a result of a plaintiff's own actions. Confronting an open and obvious
danger was an absolute bar to recovery.
Wisconsin has not limited the application of the open and obvious
danger doctrine to premises liability cases. For example, there is a
version of the doctrine found in products liability cases,6 and like the
traditional landowner application, the doctrine has acted as an absolute
bar to recovery if a defect in a product is obvious.7 Additionally,
1. Wisconsin courts have used different names to classify the unique application of open
and obvious dangers in Wisconsin tort law. See, e.g., Rockweit v. Senecal, 541 N.W.2d 742,
748 (Wis. 1995) ("open and obvious danger doctrine"); Waters v. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co., 369 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) ("open and obvious danger exception");
Griebler v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 897, 898 (Wis. 1991) ("open and
obvious danger defense"); Colip v. Travelers Ins. Co., 415 N.W.2d 525, 527 (Wis. Ct. App.
1997) ("open and obvious danger rule"). Most recently, the supreme court described it as the
"open and obvious danger doctrine." Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Serv., Inc., 2000 WI
87, 60,613 N.W.2d 142,156.
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (1965).
3. Hertelendy v. Agway Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
4. See Waters v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 369 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Wis. Ct. App.
1985).
5. See Hertelendy, 501 N.W.2d at 906.
6. See Griebler v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 897 (Wis. 1991); Sumnicht
v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2 (Wis. 1984).
7. See Tanner v. Shoupe, 596 N.W.2d 805, 806 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
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Wisconsin has applied the open and obvious danger doctrine in ordinary
negligence cases.8 Application of the doctrine in ordinary negligence
cases, however, has differed from the traditional application. In
ordinary negligence cases, the open and obvious qualities of dangers are
only elements a jury may consider in its apportionment of negligence.!
The different situations in which the open and obvious danger
doctrine has been applied"° have confused Wisconsin courts." This
Comment addresses the appropriate application of the open and
obvious danger doctrine in Wisconsin.'2 First, some of Wisconsin's
historical tort law changes are discussed and analyzed to help better
understand the current and appropriate standing of the open and
obvious danger doctrine.'3 Second, this Comment explores Wisconsin
case law to show the disparate treatment of the open and obvious
danger doctrine by the court of appeals and the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin. 4 Next, the supreme court decisions of Antoniewicz v.
Reszcynski,'5 Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America," Rockweit
8. See, e.g., Kloes v. Eau Claire Cavalier Baseball Ass'n, Inc., 487 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1992).
9. See, e.g., Wagner v. Wis. Mun. Mut. Ins. Co., 601 N.W.2d 856, 860 (Wis. Ct. App.
1999).
10. Courts have applied the doctrine to premises liability claims, strict products liability
claims, negligent products liability claims, and ordinary negligence claims. Ordinary
negligence is defined as the following:
A person is negligent when [he or she] fails to exercise ordinary care. Ordinary care
is the care which a reasonable person would use in similar circumstances. A person
is not using ordinary care and is negligent, if the person, without intending to do
harm, does something (or fails to do something) that a reasonable person would
recognize as creating an unreasonable risk of injury or damage to a person or
property.
Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, 22, 611 N.W.2d 906, 912-13 (quoting WIS. JI-CIVIL
1005).
11. See Shannon v. Shannon, 442 N.W.2d 25, 31 (Wis. 1989); Rockweit v. Senecal, 522
N.W.2d 575,580 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 541 N.W.2d 742 (Wis. 1995).
12. The author first inquired into the appropriate application of the open and obvious
danger doctrine after reading Westlund v. Werner Co., 971 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Wis. 1997).
This case analyzed Wisconsin's application of the doctrine and concluded it only acts within
the parameters of contributory negligence. See id. at 1281. According to Westlund,
landowner-invitee and manufacturer-consumer relationships would not alter the application
of the open and obvious danger doctrine; rather, Wisconsin's "supreme court would treat all
open and obvious danger doctrine cases under a comparative negligence scheme rather than
as an absolute defense to liability." Id.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.B.1.
15. 236 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1975).
16. 284 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 1975).
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v. Senecal,"' and Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Service, Inc.18 are
discussed in depth to determine the supreme court's intended use of the
doctrine."
Finally, this Comment demonstrates that the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin has already expressed its view that the open and obvious
danger doctrine should not be an absolute defense in landowner cases,
products liability negligence cases, and ordinary negligence cases. In
these situations, the open and obvious qualities of a dangerous condition
should be used only as elements when apportioning negligence.2
However, the fact that a danger is obvious may still bar strict products
liability claims and claims based upon a failure to warn."
II. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, AND
ASSUMPTION OF RISK: WISCONSIN'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Change to Comparative Negligence
In 1931, the Wisconsin Legislature drastically changed Wisconsin
tort law by altering the impact of a plaintiff's contributory negligence.
Prior to 1931, contributory negligence acted as an absolute defense in
Wisconsin by barring recovery on claims in which a plaintiff was found
to have been causally negligent.' However, as a result of the
Legislature's enactment of section 331.045 of the Wisconsin Statutes,23
17. 541 N.W.2d 742 (Wis. 1995).
18. 2000 WI 87,613 N.W.2d 142.
19. See infra Part III.B.2.
20. See Rockweit, 541 N.W.2d at 748-49 (stating that Pagelsdorf and Antoniewicz have
"abrogated the common law immunity by subsuming the concept of open and obvious danger
into the consideration of common law negligence" in which the open and obvious danger is
"merely an element to be considered by the jury in apportioning negligence and will not
operate to completely bar the plaintiff's recovery").
21. See infra Part IV.C.
22. See, e.g., Crane v. Weber, 247 N.W. 882, 882 (Wis. 1933) ("The collision occurred
before enactment by the Legislature of the comparative negligence statute, so that
contributory negligence is an absolute defense to the action.").
23. See 1931 Wis. Laws 242. This act created section 331.045 of the statutes, which read
in pertinent part:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury
to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the
person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be
diminished by the jury in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to
the person recovering.
2000]
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the absolute defense of contributory negligence was pushed aside to
welcome in the more claim-friendly 4  doctrine of comparative
negligence,' which allows a plaintiff to recover damages in some
situations in which negligence has been apportioned to the plaintiff.26 In
other words, under the comparative negligence regime, a plaintiff's
negligence does not automatically bar the plaintiff from recovery.
Instead, the comparative negligence scheme allows for a defense known
as "contributory negligence," which decreases the amount a plaintiff can
recover based on the proportion of the plaintiff's causal negligence. 7
Id. Wisconsin was only the third state to adopt comparative negligence principles. See Carol
A. Mutter, Moving to Comparative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for
Tennessee, 57 TENN. L. REV. 199, 227 n.127 (1990). By 1965, only seven states and Puerto
Rico adhered to comparative negligence. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ & EVELYN F. ROWE,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1-1, at 2 (3d ed. 1994). However, since 1970, comparative
negligence has become the norm, with contributory negligence acting as an absolute defense
in only four states by 1994. Id.
24. See Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 252 N.W. 721, 727 (Wis. 1934) ("Now,
by virtue of sec[tion] 331.045, Stats., the instances in which there is a right to recover have
been increased .... ).
25. The current statute that governs comparative negligence is section 895.045 of the
Wisconsin Statutes, which is entitled "Contributory negligence." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045
(West 1999). This statute reads:
(1) Comparative negligence. Contributory negligence does not bar recovery in an
action by any person or the person's legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if that negligence
was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought,
but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of
negligence attributed to the person recovering. The negligence of the plaintiff shall
be measured separately against the negligence of each person found to be causally
negligent. The liability of each person found to be causally negligent whose
percentage of causal negligence is less than 51% is limited to the percentage of the
total causal negligence attributed to that person. A person found to be causally
negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is 51% or more shall be jointly and
severally liable for the damages allowed.
(2) Concerted action. Notwithstanding sub. (1), if 2 or more parties act in
accordance with a common scheme or plan, those parties are jointly and severally
liable for all damages resulting from that action, except as provided in s. 895.85(5).
Id.
26. See § 895.045(1). Wisconsin utilizes a modified rather than a pure comparative
negligence approach. Contributory negligence in modified comparative negligence
jurisdictions acts as a bar to recovery if the plaintiff's negligence reaches a certain threshold.
See Mutter, supra note 23, at 229. In Wisconsin, contributory negligence does not bar
recovery unless a plaintiff's negligence is greater than that of a defendant. See infra notes 29-
30 and accompanying text. A pure approach allows a plaintiff to recover damages in
proportion to a defendant's negligence despite a finding that a plaintiff is more negligent than
a defendant. See SCHWARTZ & ROWE, supra note 23, § 2-1(a).
27. See WIS. JI-CIVIL 1007. This jury instruction spells out the standard contributory
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Wisconsin's comparative negligence statute details the comparisons
to be made when determining liability.2 A plaintiff can recover
damages so long as the plaintiff's negligence does not exceed29 that of a
particular defendant,' but the plaintiff's negligence is subtracted from
the total award in proportion to the plaintiff's percentage of
negligence 1.3  For example, assume there is a special verdict that awards
$100,000 in damages, but renders the plaintiff ten percent causally
negligent, Defendant A forty percent causally negligent, and Defendant
negligence defense:
Every person in all situations has a duty to exercise ordinary care for his or her own
safety. This does not mean that a person is required at all hazards to avoid injury; a
person must, however, exercise ordinary care to take precautions to avoid injury to
himself or herself.
Id.
28. § 895.045(1).
29. Id. (stating that "[c]ontributory negligence does not bar recovery.., if [a plaintiff's]
negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is
sought" (emphasis added)). The majority of states that adhere to a modified comparative
negligence scheme follow this "fifty percent rule," in which contributory negligence acts as a
bar to recovery only if the plaintiff's negligence is greater than that of a defendant's. See
Mutter, supra note 23, at 229. In 1990, there were nine states that used the "forty-nine
percent rule," which allows a plaintiff to recover only if the plaintiff's negligence is less than a
defendant's negligence. Id. Wisconsin is one of seven states to move from the forty-nine
percent rule to the fifty percent rule. Id. at 255 & n.254. See also McGowan v. Story, 234
N.W.2d 325, 330 (Wis. 1975) ("Under the legislation as it now exists, and has existed since
1971, a plaintiff.., who has been found 50 percent negligent, may recover 50 percent of his
damages. Under the law as it existed at the time of the accident [in] 1970, a plaintiff whose
negligence was equal to that of the defendant was foreclosed from any recovery."); 1971
Assembly Bill 50, 1971 Wis. Law. 47 (changing section 895.045 to read "not greater than," as
opposed to "not as great as").
30. See § 895.045(1) ("The negligence of the plaintiff shall be measured separately
against the negligence of each person found to be causally negligent."). This sentence, which
was added in 1995 to codify the manner in which Wisconsin courts had been interpreting the
comparative negligence statute, "determines the responsibility of each defendant to the
plaintiff." John J. Kircher, Wisconsin's Modified, Modified Comparative Negligence Law,
WiS. LAW., Feb. 1996, at 18, 20 (emphasis added). See also Walker v. Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co., 252 N.W. 721,727-28 (Wis. 1934) (comparing negligence of plaintiff to negligence
of each particular tortfeasor). For example, a plaintiff who is found to be 20% negligent is
barred from recovering from a defendant who has been attributed 10% negligence.
However, the plaintiff can recover from two other defendants who are each held 35% percent
liable. This aspect of the statute differs from the majority of states that utilize a modified
comparative negligence approach. See Mutter, supra note 23, at 258. Most states follow the
"unit rule," also called the "Arkansas rule," which allows a plaintiff to recover if the plaintiff
is less negligent than (or in some jurisdictions, equal to or less than) the combined negligence
of all defendants. Id. The minority approach is sometimes called the "Wisconsin rule" or the
"individual rule." Id.
31. See § 895.045(1) (West 1999) ("[A]ny damages allowed shall be diminished in the
proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person recovering.").
MARQ UETTE LAW REVIEW
B fifty percent causally negligent.32 It is immediately evident that the
plaintiff would be entitled to recover part of the award in this case
because the plaintiff's negligence does not exceed the individual
negligence of either defendant.3 However, the plaintiff's ten percent
contributory negligence would be deducted from the total award so that
the maximum recovery is ninety percent of the $100,000 award
($90,000). Defendant A would be responsible for forty percent of the
award ($40,000), and Defendant B would be liable for fifty percent of
the award ($50,000).
Under the comparative negligence regime, the plaintiff in this
example would be able to recover $90,000' despite a finding of
contributory negligence on the plaintiff's part. Under the old
contributory negligence regime, the plaintiff would have been barred
from recovery due to the causal negligence (ten percent) apportioned to
the plaintiff. This example illustrates the effect of comparative
negligence: namely, a plaintiff still can recover despite some negligence
apportioned to the plaintiff by the jury.
As illustrated above, comparative negligence theory is centered on
the apportionment of negligence.35 This requisite apportionment can be
performed in two manners: by the fact-finder or by law. 6 When the
jury37 apportions negligence, it can use "inferences... draw[n] from the
evidence" and can freely apportion negligence to any person or entity it
believes is negligent." On the other hand, courts have limited powers
when apportioning negligence as a matter of law.39 First, unlike a jury,
which can apportion negligence into specific percentages, a court may
apportion negligence only by finding that a plaintiff's negligence
32. If a defendant is found to be 51% or more causally negligent, then that defendant
"shall be jointly and severally liable for the damages allowed." § 895.045(1).
33. The plaintiff's 10% portion is less than Defendant A's 40% and Defendant B's 50%.
34. This is calculated by subtracting the plaintiff's proportion of negligence (10% of
$100,000) from the total award of $100,000.
35. Professor Michael McChrystal has written that "[t]he mainstay of Wisconsin
comparative negligence law is the principle that whether a victim may recover depends upon
whether the victim's contributory negligence in causing his injuries is greater than the causal
negligence of another party from whom recovery is sought." Michael K. McChrystal, Seat
Belt Negligence: The Ambivalent Wisconsin Rules, 68 MARQ. L. REv. 539,539 (1985).
36. See Peters v. Menard, Inc., 589 N.W.2d 395,404 (Wis. 1999).
37. In most tort cases, a jury, rather than a judge, is the fact-finder. Therefore, I
substitute "jury" for "fact-finder" out of convenience and familiarity.
38. Huss v. Yale Materials Handling Corp., 538 N.W.2d 630, 636-37 (Wis. Ct. App.
1995).
39. "Courts" in this section includes the supreme court and the court of appeals as well
as trial judges not acting as the primary finder of fact.
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exceeds that of a defendant.4' Second, Wisconsin case law supports the
proposition that the jury is generally the body that apportions
negligence." Ever since the first supreme court comparative negligence
opinion,42 the courts have stated the limitations upon their power to bar
recovery as a matter of law. Standard language found in Wisconsin case
law states that the court may rule that the negligence of a plaintiff is
greater, "as a matter of law," in "extremely rare" cases in which it is
"clear and uncontroverted that one party is substantially more negligent
than the other and that no reasonable jury could reach a conclusion to
the contrary. "43
40. See DeGroff v. Schmude, 238 N.W.2d 730, 734-35 (Wis. 1976) ("Apportionment of
negligence is a matter peculiarly within the province of the jury. This court has held that
ordinarily a trial court has no authority to change a jury's percentage figures....
However,... a trial court may order a new trial... whenever... the jury's findings are
contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of evidence .... "). Under comparative
negligence law, when a court rules that a plaintiff's negligence exceeds that of a defendant,
then a plaintiff is barred from recovery. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Peters, 589 N.W.2d at 404 ("Generally, the allocation of negligence is a
question for the [jury]."); Cirillo v. City of Milwaukee, 150 N.W.2d 460, 465 (Wis. 1967)
(citing Mix v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 93 N.W.2d 869, 871-72 (Wis. 1959), which stated
that "apportionment of negligence is almost always for the jury"); Gilson v. Drees Bros., 120
N.W.2d 63, 65 (Wis. 1963) (" Ordinarily the comparison of negligence is 'peculiarly within the
jury's province."' (quoting Bailey v. Bach, 44 N.W.2d 631, 635 (1950))); Huss, 538 N.W.2d at
637; Kloes v. Eau Claire Cavalier Baseball Ass'n, Inc., 487 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Wis. Ct. App.
1992).
42. See Brown v. Haertel, 244 N.W. 630, 632 (Wis. 1932). This was the first time any
Wisconsin court interpreted the comparative negligence statute. Id. at 632. At the time,
Wisconsin followed the "forty-nine percent rule," so that a plaintiff's contributory negligence
barred recovery if the plaintiff's negligence was equal to a defendant's. See supra note 29.
The supreme court stated,
While it is entirely within the province of the court to say under the facts in this case
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, it is quite
another matter for the court to say that the negligence of the plaintiff was as great as
that of the defendant. "When two persons are negligent and injury to one
proximately results from the combined negligence of both, it must often be a very
delicate and difficult question to decide whether the negligence of one was greater
than that of the other and contributed in a greater degree to produce the injury.
There is no yardstick with which to measure the two acts of negligence, nor scales
with which to weigh them."
Brown, 244 N.W. at 632 (quoting Dohr v. Wis. Cent. Ry. Co., 129 N.W. 252, 255 (Wis. 1911)
(Winslow, C.J., dissenting)).
43. Huss v. Yale Materials Handling Corp., 538 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
But see Peters, 589 N.W.2d at 404 ("[W]hen it is apparent to the court that the plaintiff's
negligence is, as a matter of law, greater than any negligence on defendant's part, it is the
court's duty to so hold.") (emphasis added).
2000]
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B. Assumption of Risk
The Legislature's enactment of the comparative negligence statute in
1931 immediately eliminated use of contributory negligence as a per se
bar to recovery. Although the direct scope of the statute pertains to the
effects of negligence allocation, its ramifications on tort law are far-
reaching. For example, the supreme court relied heavily on comparative
negligence principles when it abrogated assumption of risk. Assumption
of risk acted very similarly to the modern contributory negligence
defense in that both defenses limited recovery due to a plaintiff's
actions. However, unlike the modem contributory negligence defense,
which allows a plaintiff to recover at least part of an award if a plaintiff's
negligence is less than that of a defendant, assumption of risk
completely barred recovery."
Prior to the enactment of comparative negligence, there was
generally no great need to distinguish between assumption of risk and
contributory negligence because both acted as complete bars to a
plaintiff's recovery." However, after the adoption of comparative
negligence, a distinction between the two doctrines became paramount
because assumption of risk often barred claims whereas contributory
negligence did not.6
Assumption of risk focused on a plaintiff's consent, which could be
implied "from the injured party's willingness to proceed in the face of a
hazard to his safety, known and appreciated by him."'47 When a person
assumed the "risk of... particular conduct," liability could not be
imposed on those who may have acted negligently but for the assumed
risk.' The implied consent to a known danger acted as a complete bar
to recovery.49
Assumption of risk originally applied in master and servantsO cases
44. See, e.g., Colson v. Rule, 113 N.W.2d 21,22-23 (Wis. 1962).
45. David K. Harbinson, Comment, Distinction Between Assumption of Risk and
Contributory Negligence in Wisconsin, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 460,460 (1960).
46. See id.
47. McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 113 N.W.2d 14, 16 (Wis. 1962). See
also Harbinson, supra note 45, at 464 (stating that "the court has required both a 'consensual
relationship' and the traditional elements of: (1) hazard or danger inconsistent with the safety
of the plaintiff, (2) knowledge and appreciation of the danger by the plaintiff, (3)
acquiescence or a willingness to accept the danger") (footnote omitted).
48. McConville, 113 N.W.2d at 16 ("[T]he law has declined to impose liability on the
actor for conduct which would constitute negligence but for the implication that the injured
party has assumed the risk of the particular conduct.").
49. See id.
50. These cases are also described as employer-employee cases. See Harbinson, supra
[Vol. 84:445
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and cases that involved expressed contractual assumption of risk.' The
reasoning behind the doctrine can be expressed by the Latin maxim,
"Volenti non fit injuria," which means, "To the willing, there is no
injury."'  In addition to master-servant cases, the supreme court
extended assumption of risk to automobile host-guest cases.-3 One of
the reasons for imposing the defense within the host-guest relationship
is that an automobile host owed a limited duty" to a guest similar to the
limited duty a landowner owed a licensee.55 Additionally, Wisconsin
courts considered guests to be in a position where they could effectively
protest a driver's negligent acts. 6
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin eliminated the assumption of risk
doctrine from Wisconsin jurisprudence in the early 1960s as it moved
away from absolute defenses and focused more on comparative
negligence principles.' McConville v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. and Colson v. Rule, decided on the same day in January
1962, abolished assumption of risk as a defense in their respective fields
note 45, at 469.
51. See Jerome E. Gull, Note, Negligence-Abolition of the Doctrine of Assumption of
Risk in Host-Guest Cases, 46 MARQ. L. REV. 119, 120 (1962). See also Switzer v. Weiner, 284
N.W. 509, 511 (Wis. 1939) ("In this state it has been held that the doctrine of assumption of
risk does not obtain except where there is a contractual relationship between the parties.").
52. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 587 (9th ed. 1994). See also Gull, supra note 51, at 120.
53. See Switzer v. Weiner, 284 N.W. 509,511 (Wis. 1939).
54. The automobile host had a duty of "not increasing the danger or creating a new one
naturally resulting from the acceptance by the guest of the invitation extended by the host."
Haines v. Duffy, 240 N.W. 152, 153 (Wis. 1931).
55. See Gull, supra note 51, at 120. For an explanation of a landowner's duty to a
licensee, see infra text accompanying notes 95-96.
56. One commentator argued that the only true distinction between assumption of risk
and contributory negligence was the "consensual relationship" between the parties. See
Harbinson, supra note 45, at 468-71. The commentator argued that the court found consent
only when the "association between the litigants... [was] sufficiently close that the plaintiff
could protest effectively." Id. at 469. Courts have held host-guest relationships to entail such
a close relationship that a guest had a duty to protest when a host began to drive negligently.
See Haines, 240 N.W. at 153 ("The duty to protest grows out of the relation of host and guest,
and it constitutes an essential element in the question of whether the guest may recover
damages resulting from the negligence of the host."). Therefore, in cases other than
employer-employee and host-guest, the court applied the contributory negligence defense
rather than assumption of risk because the requisite consent for assumption of risk could not
be found. See also Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 76 N.W.2d 355,360 (Wis. 1956) ("Wisconsin
has limited the application of the defense of assumption of risk to situations where there is a
consensual relationship between the defendant and plaintiff such as host and guest, or master
and servant.").
57. See Gilson v. Drees Bros., 120 N.W.2d 63 (Wis. 1963); McConville v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 113 N.W.2d 14 (Wis. 1962); Colson v. Rule, 113 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1962).
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due to the view that comparative negligence principles would lead to
less injustice than the total bar to recovery found in assumption of risk
cases.
In McConville, the supreme court held that an automobile guest
would no longer be subjected to the assumption of risk defense "implied
from his willingness to proceed in the face of a known hazard., 59 The
court determined that the low duty of care an automobile host owed a
guest did not adequately address the severe injuries inherent in
automobile accidents.60 Furthermore, the court stated that public policy
would not allow implicit consent to danger to act as an absolute bar to
compensation.6' Consequently, the court imposed upon automobile
hosts a duty of ordinary care toward automobile guests.' With this duty
of ordinary care, any implied assumption of risk by the plaintiff is to be
analyzed as part of the contributory negligence defense under
58. McConville, 113 N.W.2d at 17; Colson, 113 N.W.2d at 22.
59. McConville, 113 N.W.2d at 16. This case abolished implied assumption of risk, but
not express assumption of risk. See Colson, 113 N.W.2d at 22. The court adopted the
following rules:
(1) The driver of an automobile owes his guest the same duty of ordinary care that
he owes to others; (2) A guest's assumption of risk, heretofore implied from his
willingness to proceed in the face of a known hazard is no longer a defense separate
from contributory negligence; (3) If a guest's exposure of himself to a particular
hazard be unreasonable and a failure to exercise ordinary care for his own safety,
such conduct is negligence, and is subject to the comparative negligence statute.
McConville, 113 N.W.2d at 16-17.
60. See id. at 19. The court reasoned,
We feel that the limitation on the duty of the automobile host... is no longer
consistent with sound policy.... The analogy to the licensor-licensee
relationship... may have been validly applied to the relationship of automobile
host-guest... [when] automobiles were fewer... [and] incapable of great speed ....
The serious consequences following automobile accidents today are well known ....
In view of the seriousness of many injuries, and the burdens falling upon the
community as well as the individuals and families affected, it is doubtful whether the
type of consent or acquiescence to danger, heretofore called assumption of risk,
should be permitted to cut off completely the right to recover damages.
Id. See also supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
61. McConville, 113 N.W.2d at 19 ("Consent seems not to be a satisfactory basis for
retaining the doctrine of assumption of risk. The consequences of an automobile accident to
a guest may be so disastrous that it would be contrary to public policy to hold that an
individual who consents by implication to a dangerous situation will go uncompensated for his
injuries.").
62 Id. ("A driver of an automobile should be held to the full standard of duty of
ordinary care to his guests, as he is to other users of the highways.").
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comparative negligence.'
The court demonstrated in McConville that it believed comparative
negligence to be the appropriate method for determining liability in
host-guest cases for two reasons. First, comparative negligence focuses
on reasonableness of actions.64 By abolishing assumption of risk, the
court did not in turn grant immunity to automobile guests; rather, if a
guest unreasonably faces a known danger, then the guest is guilty of
contributory negligence,6' which mitigates damagese or, occasionally,
even acts as a complete bar to recovery.67 Second, the court believed
that justice is better served by comparative negligence principles. In
some cases, a guest might act reasonably when facing a known danger.6'
Under assumption of risk, facing a known danger, whether reasonable
or not, barred recovery. Comparative negligence, on the other hand,
does not punish reasonable behavior, and a plaintiff who acts reasonably
is not barred from bringing a claim. Since comparative negligence
adequately mitigates damages and allows recovery for those not acting
unreasonably, the court made "the policy judgment.., that much more
injustice will be avoided in the instances where acquiescence ceases to
raise a complete defense and becomes a matter for comparison by the
trier of the fact."'69
The situation in Colson, albeit slightly different from McConville,
produced a similar result. In Colson, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
addressed the issue of assumption of risk in master and servant cases.0
As in McConville, the supreme court declined to apply assumption of
risk and instead relied on comparative negligence principles.71 One of
the reasons the supreme court abandoned assumption of risk is that the
63. See id.
64. See id. at 16-17.
65. See id. at 19-20 ("Conduct which has heretofore been denominated assumption of
risk may constitute contributory negligence as well. The unreasonable assumption of risk
constitutes negligence. In the present case the jury should have been asked whether the
[guest] was negligent for his own safety in riding with [the driver]." (footnote omitted)).
66. See supra note 31 and accompany text.
67. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
68. See McConville, 113 N.W.2d at 17 ("There may be circumstances where a guest's
willingness to proceed in the face of a known hazard for which the host is responsible is not
unreasonable.").
69. See id. at 17. The court further stated, "We are of the opinion that the new rule
announced herein is more in harmony with the principle of comparative negligence adopted
by our legislature than was [assumption of risk]." Id. at 20.
70. Colson v Rule, 113 N.W.2d 21,22 (Wis. 1962).
71. See id.
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doctrine "tends to immunize those employers from liability who are the
greatest transgressors in providing safe [working conditions] for their
employees."7' The court viewed assumption of risk as encouraging
employers not to make the workplace as safe as possible, but to use
clearly "defective" machines that would deem the requisite consent'
from the workers because any work would be "in the face of a
hazard ... known and appreciated. "7'
Finally, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided Gilson v. Drees
Bros., ' which abrogated assumption of risk in "all situations involving
tacit assumption of risk."76 The court opined that in cases where there is
not an "express assumption of a known risk," contributory negligence
principles would bring "greater fairness" than would assumption of
risk."
As a result of this line of cases, it is evident that the supreme court
favored the comparative negligence principles over assumption of risk,
which acted as a total bar to recovery. Therefore, the doctrine known as
assumption of risk is "no longer a bar to an action for negligence" 78 and
is "no longer a defense separate from contributory negligence."79
72- Id.
73. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
74. McConville, 113 N.W.2d at 16; Colson, 113 N.W.2d at 22. The court also considered
the assumption of risk defense to be too similar to contributory negligence. Colson, 113
N.W.2d at 23 ("The attempted distinction between the assumption of risk and contributory
negligence is highly technical and in many fact situations it is very difficult for trial courts to
distinguish between the two."). Therefore, in master and servant situations, "where an
employee assumes a risk more hazardous than ordinarily careful and prudent men similarly
situated usually assume, such conduct ought to be deemed contributory negligence and
subject to the comparative negligence statute." Id.
75. 120 N.W.2d 63, 67 (Wis. 1963).
76. Polsky v. Levine, 243 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Wis. 1976).
77. Gilson v, Drees Bros., 120 N.W.2d 63, 67 (Wis. 1963). The court stated:
[I]t is our opinion that greater fairness will result if the claimed negligence... is
couched in terms of contributory negligence rather than in terms of assumption of
risk. This will be true whenever the alleged assumption of risk arises by implication,
as here, as opposed to an express assumption of a known risk. This would serve to
extend the rule adopted in the McConville and Colson Cases to all situations
involving the tacit assumption of risk.
Id.
78. Polsky, 243 N.W.2d at 505.
79. McConville, 113 N.W.2d at 16.
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Ill. THE OPEN AND OBVIOUS DANGER DOCTRINE: ITS PRECARIOUS
POSITION IN WISCONSIN LAW
Part II of this Comment briefly demonstrates that Wisconsin courts
have been drifting away from complete bars to recovery to a more
flexible standard of comparing the negligence of a plaintiff and
defendant." However, as the comparative negligence statute came to
dominate Wisconsin law and assumption of risk faded into the past, the
open and obvious danger doctrine, which may act as a total bar to a
plaintiff's recovery,81 has lurked in Wisconsin case law up to date."
Nevertheless, careful examination of Supreme Court of Wisconsin
decisions suggests that this doctrine may not survive as an absolute bar
to recovery much longer.
A. The Elements and Nature of the Open and Obvious Danger Doctrine
1. Landowners and Premises Liability
Historically, landowners reigned supreme over their premises so that
they were immune from liability relating to their land.' Landowner
sovereignty resulted from the belief that landowners possessed the right
to use their land as they so chose.' This belief originated in common-
law feudalism, in which landowners possessed a high status in society.
Feudal landowners possessed "vast estates," and it was difficult to
maintain safe premises for the many entrants upon their property."
Over time, landowners lost the luxury of complete immunity as common
80. See supra Part II.
81. See Hansen v. New Holland N. Am., Inc., 574 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)
("While in the context of manufacturer-consumer strict liability and landowner cases[,] a
defendant may still owe no duty to a plaintiff who confronts a danger that is open and
obvious .... ") (footnote omitted).
82. See, e.g., Wagner v. Wis. Mun. Mut. Ins. Co., 601 N.W.2d 856 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
83. See Lucinda S. Ingram, Note, Missouri Retreats from the Known or Obvious Danger
Rule in Premises Liability, 54 Mo. L. REv. 241,241 (1989).
84. See Ann K. Dittmeier, Note, Premises Liability: The Disappearance of the Open and
Obvious Doctrine, 64 MO. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1999); Ingram, supra note 83, at 243 ("English
landlords were a powerful class and enjoyed a favored status in the law.").
85. Ingram, supra note 83, at 241 & n.3 ("The view that the owner or occupier was
sovereign over his land was deeply rooted in common law feudalism.").
86. Id. at 241 n.3. ("[T]he special privilege these rules accord.., sprang from the high
place that land has traditionally held in England and America .... The common law view
was based, in part, on the proposition that English manor lords would have difficulty
regulating entries onto the lands of their vast estates." (citing F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 27.1, at 131-32 (1986))).
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law created landowner limited liability.' Two examples of landowner
limited liability are the different duties owed to entrants upon property'
and the open and obvious danger doctrine."
a. Common-Law Immunities and the Distinctions Between Entrants upon
Property
Under common law, a landowner's duty of care depended on the
status of the person who entered upon the property.' An entrant could
be a trespasser, a licensee, or an invitee." Trespassers received the most
limited standard of care,' while the duty owed to an invitee was that of
ordinary care." The middle standard of care, which applied to licensees,
restricted liability to two situations: "traps" on the premises and active
negligence94 on part of the landowner.95 "Traps" were dangers known to
a landowner but concealed to a licensee.96 Therefore, under the limited
liability theory, landowners were not liable to licensees for any injuries
that resulted from open and obvious dangers because such dangers
could not be considered "traps." Landowners simply had no duty to
protect or warn licensees of dangers on their premises that were not
concealed." Similarly, as indicated in section 343A of the Restatement
87. See Dittmeier, supra note 84, at 1023. The supreme court described the distinctions
as "common-law immunities of the owners and occupiers of land." Antoniewicz v.
Reszcynski, 236 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Wis. 1975)
88. See Dittmeier, supra note 84, at 1023. The classifications generally are trespasser,
licensee, and invitee. Id. See also infra Part III.A.l.a.
89. See Ingram, supra note 83, at 241.
90. See Szafranski v. Radetzky, 141 N.W.2d 902, 905 (Wis. 1966).
91. See generally Mark A. Peterson, Note, Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land,
58 MARQ. L. REV. 609 (1975) (discussing the distinction between trespassers, licensees, and
invitees).
92. See Szafranski, 141 N.W.2d at 905 ("If the person is a trespasser, the owner of land
has the duty to refrain from wilful and intentional injury."). "A trespasser is one who enters
another's premises without an express or implied invitation from the other person, and solely
for his own pleasure, advantage or purpose." Peterson, supra note 91, at 610 (citing WiS. JI-
CIVIL 8012).
93. Szafranski, 141 N.W.2d at 905. "A person who expressly or impliedly is invited upon
another's premises for the purpose of aiding, transacting, assisting or furthering the business
of the other, or who is on the premises for a purpose mutually beneficial to himself and to the
possessor of the premises, is an invitee." Peterson, supra note 91, at 613 (citing WIS. JI-CIVIL
8010).
94. The supreme court defined "active negligence" as it related to licensor-licensee cases
as "the carrying on of some operation or activity in a negligent manner." Terpstra v. Soiltest,
Inc., 218 N.W.2d 129, 132 (Wis. 1974).
95. Szafranski, 141 N.W.2d at 905.
96. Id.
97. Scheeler v. Bahr, 164 N.W.2d 310, 312 (Wis. 1969) ("[I]f there is no concealed hazard
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(Second) of Torts, landowners did not have a duty to protect invitees
from obvious dangers on their premises.8
b. The Open and Obvious Danger Doctrine
The reasoning behind the open and obvious danger doctrine
historically mirrored the landowner limited liability theory noted above.
Occupiers of land had no duty to warn or protect invitees and licensees
from dangers that the entrants knew existed on the property.' The
reason that landowners at common law had no duty to protect invitees
from obvious conditions is that "invitees [were], in most circumstances,
expected to protect themselves from obvious dangers."'00 Furthermore,
landowners possessed a privileged status in society and courts believed it
would be unfair to place upon them the heavy "burden of inspecting and
improving [their] primitive land."'' These two reasons outweighed the
countervailing argument that landowners should be liable for
unreasonable dangers on their premises because their "position of
control" of their premises allowed them to be the ones best able to
remedy hazardous conditions.'#
In Scheeler v. Bahr, an early open and obvious danger case, the
supreme court reaffirmed the notion that landowners owe no duty to
protect licensees from observable dangers.' The plaintiff in Scheeler
argued that his knowledge of the danger should not affect the
landowner's duty toward him but should only be used as an element of
no duty is imposed upon the licensor to protect the licensee."). Further, a landowner was not
liable for concealed dangers if such dangers were not known to the landowner. Szafranski,
141 N.W.2d at 905 (stating that a landowner has "no obligation to the licensee in regard to
dangers that are unknown to [the landowner]").
98. See infra notes 112-28 and accompanying text.
99. See Jacqueline L. Hourigan, Note, Where Hazardous Condition Is of an Open and
Obvious Nature, Premises Owner Retains Duty to Warn of Unreasonable Risk, 73 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 613, 618 (1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 340 (1934)).
100. Hertelendy v. Agway Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Wis. 1993) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(1) (1965)).
101. Waters v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 369 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Wis. Ct. App.
1985). Cf. supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
102. See Waters, 369 N.W.2d at 758.
103. 164 N.W.2d 310 (Wis. 1969).
104. Id. at 311 ("In Wisconsin the duty owed by the possessor of land to a licensee is a
limited one."). The plaintiff in Scheeler dove off of a pier that extended seventy feet from the
shore of the lake. Id. The water at the end of the pier was only three feet deep, and the
plaintiff struck his head on the bottom of the lake and was injured. Id. The plaintiff alleged
the shallow water was a "trap," i.e., a concealed danger known to the landowner, of which the
landowner failed to warn. Id.
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his contributory negligence. 5 The court rejected the argument and
instead stated that even in instances where a duty to warn ordinarily
would exist, a landowner's duty to warn is relieved by a plaintiff who
confronts an obvious hazard.' 6  At this stage of Wisconsin law, a
plaintiff's confrontation of an open and obvious danger acted as an
absolute bar to recovery.' °
Wisconsin has viewed the open and obvious danger doctrine as
consisting of the elements of section 343A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.'lo Section 343A is entitled "Known or Obvious Dangers" and it
applies to "possessor[s] of land."'" Generally, section 343A mandates
that landowners are not liable for any harm arising out of obviously
dangerous conditions or activities on their land.10 However, there is
liability if the harm should be anticipated by the landowner regardless of
the obvious nature of the danger or if the injured person knew of the
danger."' Inherent in this rule are two tests, a subjective test and an
105. Id. at 312.
106. Id. at 313.
107. The open and obvious danger doctrine has been used most often in diving cases.
See, e.g., Griebler v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 897 (Wis. 1991); Scheeler v.
Bahr, 164 N.W.2d 310 (Wis. 1969); Wisnicky v. Fox Hills Inn & Country Club, Inc., 473
N.W.2d 523 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (dealing with the safe place statute, section 101.11 of the
Wisconsin Statutes); Davenport v. Gilmore, 431 N.W.2d 701 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988); Colip v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 415 N.W.2d 525 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). But see Gould v. Allstar Ins. Co.,
208 N.W.2d 388, 392-94 (Wis. 1973) (holding that comparative negligence principles, not open
and obvious dangers, govern safe place claims). For a discussion on the application of the
open and obvious danger doctrine in diving cases, see Greg Sobo, Look Before You Leap:
Can the Emergence of the Open and Obvious Danger Defense Save Diving from Troubled
Waters?, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 175 (1998).
108. See Griebler v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 449 N.W.2d 61, 64 (Wis. Ct. App.
1989) ("Our supreme court approved Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 343A (1965) in
Treps [v. City of Racine, 243 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Wis. 1976)]."), rev'd, 466 N.W.2d 897 (Wis.
1991).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 343A (1965).
110. Section 343A reads:
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them
by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them,
unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or
obviousness.
(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate harm from a known or
obvious danger, the fact that the invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of
the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance indicating that the harm
should be anticipated.
Id.
111. Id.
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objective test."2
First, the subjective test determines landowner liability by examining
the individual plaintiff's knowledge of the dangerous condition. A
landowner is not liable for injuries to an invitee if an invitee knows of
the dangerous condition or activity."' Wisconsin has not thoroughly
analyzed this "known danger" test as of yet,"' but the Restatement notes
that the injured person must know of the "condition" and must also
appreciate the danger that the condition involves.1
The second test that can be applied is an objective test, and this is
derived from the "obvious" half of "known or obvious dangers."'16 As
an objective test, a reasonable person must be likely to "recognize" both
the condition and danger involved with the condition."7 In an odd
reading of the Restatement, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin determined
that a reasonable person does not have to recognize "the gravity of the
harm threatened by the open and obvious condition" because it is not a
part of the objective test; rather, it is part of the subjective test found in
comment b of the Restatement.18
Finally, a general exception to the open and obvious danger doctrine
can be found in Wisconsin case law and the wording of the Restatement.
A landowner may still be liable if the harm may be anticipated
regardless of whether the dangerous condition is known or obvious. 9
This language and comment 1, illustration 5 of the Restatement form the
112. See Griebler v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 897, 900 (Wis. 1991). The
supreme court acknowledges the existence of both the objective and subject test, but the
court leaves analysis of the subjective test for another day. See id.
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A.
114. See Griebler, 466 N.W.2d at 900.
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. b (1965).
116. See Griebler, 466 N.W.2d at 900-01.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. b (1965).
118. Griebler, 466 N.W.2d at 901 (emphasis added). Comment b to section 343A reads,
The word "known" denotes not only knowledge of the existence of the
condition or activity itself, but also appreciation of the danger it involves. Thus
the condition or activity must not only be known to exist, but it must also be
recognized that it is dangerous, and the probability and gravity of the
threatened harm must be appreciated. "Obvious" means that both the
condition and the risk are apparent to and would be recognized by a reasonable
man, in the position of the visitor, exercising ordinary perception, intelligence,
and judgment.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. b (1965).
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(1) (1965) (stating there is liability
if "the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness").
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
basis for Maci v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,'20 in which the Court of
Appeals of Wisconsin suggested that this exception be added to the
Wisconsin civil jury instructions. In Maci, the plaintiff slipped on an
icy path leading to a garage door, which was the only path available for
the plaintiff.'2 The court of appeals determined that the defendant
landowner should have known that the plaintiff would have to traverse
the icy property in order to lock the garage door after taking out his car;
therefore, the landowner did have a duty to make his land reasonably
safe for the plaintiff.'23 Subsequent court decisions interpret the Maci
exception as imposing liability upon landowners only when the obvious
danger is unavoidable to the injured person or when a person's attention
is likely to be distracted from the danger. 2'
2. Products Liability
Although the common-law origin of the open and obvious danger
doctrine applied to landowners, Wisconsin courts have used open and
obvious danger principles in other fields of tort law, particularly in
products liability cases.'" Generally speaking, products liability claims
may be based on two different theories: strict liability and/or
negligence.'" Both strict liability and negligence claims are similar in
that they impose liability upon manufacturers for producing dangerous
products, but strict liability allows a plaintiff to recover without
120. 314 N.W.2d 914 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
121. Id. at 918-19. The court of appeals suggested Wis. JI-Civil 8020 should be changed
to include:
However, where a known and obvious condition or defect exists on the premises and
is unavoidable by the person on the premises, a possessor of premises is not relieved
of liability for physical harm to said person arising from said defect or condition
merely by warning such person of the condition or defect.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
122. Id. at 916, 918.
123. See id.
124. See Colip v. Travelers Ins. Co., 415 N.W.2d 525, 527-28 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)
(stating that the "exception [to the open and obvious danger doctrine] is recognized only: (1)
where the injured person was somehow distracted; and (2) where the injured person was
unable to avoid the danger" (citations omitted)). See also Griebler v. Doughboy
Recreational, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 897, 898 n.1 (Wis. 1991); Taft v. Derricks, 2000 WI App. 103,
26, 613 N.W.2d 190, 197 ("If the plaintiff, despite the obviousness of the danger, is faced with
no reasonable alternative, the plaintiff does not 'voluntarily confront' the danger.").
125. See, e.g., Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2 (Wis. 1984).
126. Morden v. Continental AG, 2000 WI 51, 1 42, 611 N.W.2d 659, 673.
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requiring proof of a manufacturer's specific acts of negligence."z Strict
liability may apply to defective manufacturing claims as well as defective
design claims." However, negligence claims require a plaintiff to show
that a manufacturer breached the standard of ordinary care in its
production of a product 9  A manufacturer may be liable for claims
such as negligent manufacturing or negligent design of a product."'
When strict liability and negligence claims are separated and analyzed, it
is evident that the open and obvious danger doctrine in strict products
liability cases is derived from the consumer-contemplation test.
However, for products liability claims that sound in negligence, the
doctrine originates from Griebler v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., which
improperly analyzed negligence claims within the same discussion as
strict liability.13
2
a. Strict Liability and the Consumer-Contemplation Test
Generally, strict liability in Wisconsin requires proof of two initial
elements: first, a product must be defective at the time it left the control
of a seller, and second, a defective product must pose an unreasonable
danger to an average consumer.13 3 Open and obvious dangers act as a
complete defense to strict liability claims because Wisconsin courts have
held that defects that are open and obvious cannot be unreasonably
127. Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (Wis. 1967). In Dippel, Wisconsin adopted
strict products liability consistent with section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
The elements to be proven in strict products liability are:
(1) that the product was in defective condition when it left the possession or control
of the seller, (2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, (3) that
the defect was a cause (a substantial factor) of the plaintiff's injuries or damages, (4)
that the seller engaged in the business of selling such product or, put negatively, that
this is not an isolated or infrequent transaction not related to the principal business
of the seller, and (5) that the product was one which the seller expected to and did
reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition it was when
he sold it.
Dippel, 155 N.W.2d at 63.
128. See Arbet v. Gussarson, 225 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Wis. 1975); Schuh v. Fox River
Tractor Co., 218 N.W.2d 279,284 (Wis. 1974).
129. See Greiten v. Ladow, 235 N.W.2d 677,685 (Wis. 1975).
130. See, e.g., id. at 683.
131. See infra Part III.A.2.a.
132. See infra Part III.A.2.b.
133. See Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2, 15-16 (Wis. 1984).
Although Sumnicht differentiates between the two elements, courts often consider the two
simultaneously. Tanner v. Shoupe, 596 N.W.2d 805, 812 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
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dangerous to the consumer."'
The open and obvious danger doctrine utilized in strict liability cases
hinges on an objective standard: a product is not unreasonably
dangerous "[i]f the average consumer would reasonably anticipate the
dangerous condition of the product and fully appreciate the attendant
risk of injury." '135  This is generally known as the consumer-
contemplation test,'36 and a jury generally decides whether an average
consumer would appreciate the risk of injury.137 The fact that a
consumer may or may not have actually known of the danger is not a
factor in whether the product was unreasonably dangerous. Instead, a
consumer's actual knowledge of a dangerous defect is accounted for
under the contributory negligence defense found in the comparative
negligence statute.
1 39
Manufacturers are not strictly liable for injuries caused by open and
obvious defects, and accordingly, manufacturers have no duty to warn of
open and obvious dangers inherent in a product.'9 However, when
defects are hidden or latent, a manufacturer must adequately warn
consumers of such dangers.' 4' A warning is adequate only if it heightens
134. See Tanner, 596 N.W.2d at 812 ("In order for a defective design to render a product
unreasonably dangerous the defect must be hidden from the ordinary consumer, that is, not
an open and obvious defect.").
135. See Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794,
798 (Wis. 1975).
136. Sumnicht, 360 N.W.2d at 15. In Arbet v. Gussarson, 225 N.W.2d 431 (Wis. 1975),
the supreme court adopted comment i of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which states that "[tihe article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics." Id. at 435. Additionally, the court has
also adopted comment g, which defines "defective condition" as "where the product is, at the
time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer,
which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." Vincer, 230 N.W.2d at 797-98. Therefore,
Wisconsin follows the "consumer-contemplation test," and a product is not unreasonably
dangerous unless the defect is such that an average consumer would not reasonably expect it.
Sumnicht, 360 N.W.2d at 15.
137. Hansen v. New Holland N. Am., Inc., 574 N.W.2d 250,253 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
138. Vincer, 230 N.W.2d at 798 ("This is an objective test and is not dependent upon the
knowledge of the particular injured consumer ... ").
139. Id. at 798-99 (stating that "knowledge [of the danger] may be evidence of
contributory negligence under the circumstances").
140. Estate of Schilling v. Blount, Inc., 449 N.W.2d 56, 59 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that inherent danger of cocking the hammer of a gun containing live bullets constitutes an
open and obvious danger that the average consumer would recognize; thus, there is no duty to
warn of inherent danger that is open and obvious to the community at large).
141. See, e.g., Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 275 N.W.2d 915, 922 (Wis. 1979);
Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 218 N.W.2d 279,285 (Wis. 1974) ("'The duty to warn... is a
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a consumer's awareness of the defect to a degree "that would cause a
reasonable man to exercise for his own safety the caution commensurate
with the potential danger."1"2 Therefore, if a jury determines a defect is
not obvious to an average consumer, the question arises as to whether
there is an adequate warning that makes a hidden defect known to the
average consumer. Without such a warning, a product will likely be
defective and unreasonably dangerous."'
b. Griebler Extends the Open and Obvious Danger Doctrine into all
Aspects of Products Liability
Although the open and obvious danger doctrine in products liability
originated in strict liability cases,1" the supreme court extended the
doctrine to all products liability claims in Griebler v. Doughboy
Recreational, Inc. 4  The plaintiff in Griebler sustained injuries while
diving into a pool manufactured by Doughboy Recreational.' 1  As a
result, Griebler sued both the landowner for negligence and Doughboy
for claims based on strict products liability and negligence.47 The court,
relying on a string of landowner open and obvious danger diving cases,1
8
held that diving headfirst into waters of unknown depth constituted a
confrontation of an open and obvious danger.4 9 Then, in one sweeping
sentence, the court stated that the open and obvious danger doctrine
applies to products liability cases sounding in either strict liability or
negligence.c In doing so, the court intertwined years of landowner open
duty to give a warning which is adequate and appropriate under the circumstances."' (quoting
Annotation, Products Liability-Duty to Warn, 76 A.L.R.2d 15 (1961)); Schilling, 449 N.W.2d
56.
142. Kozlowski, 275 N.W.2d at 922-23. Not only is there a duty to wam of hidden
dangers, but a manufacturer must also reasonably try to place the warning in an area that is
likely to attract the users' attention. See Schuh, 218 N.W.2d at 284.
143. See Kozlowski, 275 N.W.2d at 921; Tanner v. Shoupe, 596 N.W.2d 805,812 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1999).
144. See Kozlowski, 275 N.W. 2d at 920 ("Were this court able to conclude that the
evidence in this case demonstrated an obvious defect not unreasonably dangerous, the
manufacturer would not be automatically relieved from liability.").
145. 466 N.W.2d 897 (Wis. 1991).
146. Id. at 899.
147. Id.
148. The court relied upon Scheeler v. Bahr, 164 N.W.2d 310 (Wis. 1969), Davenport v.
Gillmore, 431 N.W.2d 701 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988), and Colip v. Travelers Insurance Co., 415
N.W.2d 525 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
149. Griebler, 466 N.W.2d at 898-99.
150. Id. at 902 ("[Tlhe open and obvious danger defense is available to defendants in
products liability actions in this state whether the actions sounds in negligence or strict
products liability." (citing Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230
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and obvious danger doctrine decisions with strict liability cases based
upon the consumer-contemplation test. Furthermore, it also entangled
strict products liability claims with products liability claims sounding in
negligence. 5' In Griebler, the open and obvious danger doctrine did not
differentiate between claims based upon strict products liability and
those claims sounding in negligence, such as negligent manufacturing or
negligent design.
3. Ordinary Negligence
Finally, Wisconsin courts have applied the open and obvious danger
N.W.2d 794 (Wis. 1975))). In Vincer, the court dismissed products liability claims based on
strict liability and negligence. Vincer, 230 N.W.2d at 797. The court focused on strict liability
under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, but in regards to the negligence
claims, it merely stated that "even under negligence law, the plaintiff still must prove that the
product causing the injury was dangerous and defective." Id. In its strict liability analysis, the
court concluded that the product was not unreasonably dangerous, and without further
discussion as to the negligence claim, the court dismissed the plaintiff's entire case. Id. at 799.
Griebler's reliance on Vincer is misplaced due to previous supreme court decisions that
criticized and even withdrew part of Vincer's cursory negligence analysis. In Greiten v.
LaDow, 235 N.W.2d 677 (Wis. 1975), Justice Robert Hansen's "majority" opinion cited and
quoted Vincer for the proposition that a plaintiff must prove a product is unreasonably
dangerous in order to recover under either strict liability or negligence. Id. at 682 (R.
Hansen, J., concurring) (quoting Vincer's language that stated, "However, even under
negligence law, the plaintiff still must prove that the product causing the injury was dangerous
and defective...."). However, due to a three-one-three split between the justices, Justice
Heffernan's "concurring opinion" is actually the opinion of the court. See Howes v. Deere &
Co., 238 N.W.2d 76 (Wis. 1976) ("[Justice Heffernan's] opinion, in fact, represents the
decision of a majority of the court and it is, therefore, the opinion of this court. The opinion
of Mr. Justice Robert W. Hansen is the concurring opinion."). Justice Heffernan's opinion
disagreed with Vincer's analysis that a plaintiff must first prove, in either strict liability or
negligence, that a product was unreasonably dangerous. See id. at 684-85. According to
Justice Heffernan, strict liability is "not intended to modify or limit a plaintiff's right to
recover." Id. at 684. Rather, "there may be recovery for the negligent design of a product
even though it is not unreasonably dangerous in the 402 A sense. All that is necessary to
prove is that the product is designed with a lack of ordinary care and that lack of care resulted
in injury." Id. at 685.
Additionally, soon after Greiten, the supreme court continued to distinguish strict
liability from negligence by specifically withdrawing Vincer's troublesome negligence
language. See Howes v. Deere & Co., 238 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Wis. 1976). ("The statement
['However, even under negligence law, the plaintiff still must prove that the product causing
the injury was dangerous and defective'] is not relevant to the ultimate decision in [Vincer]
and is herewith withdrawn."). Therefore, Griebler's reliance on Vincer for the proposition
that the open and obvious danger doctrine bars claims in either strict liability or negligence is
an improper application of Wisconsin law. Strict liability under Dippel and section 402A of
the Restatement is "totally irrelevant" to negligence actions. Greiten, 235 N.W.2d at 684.
151. Wisconsin law is clear that a plaintiff may recover for "the negligent design of a
product even though the product is not unreasonably dangerous in a strict product liability
sense." Sharp v. Case Corp., 595 N.W.2d 380,383 (Wis. 1999). See also supra note 150.
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doctrine in ordinary negligence cases. 2  Basically, these cases
encompass negligence claims not falling within premises or products
liability. For ordinary negligence cases, courts have refused to apply the
open and obvious danger doctrine as an absolute bar to recovery.53
B. Application of the Open and Obvious Danger Doctine
1. Different Applications of the Doctrine
Over the years, Wisconsin courts have treated the open and obvious
danger doctrine in disparate fashions.M First, courts addressed the
doctrine in "duty" considerations.155 Next, some courts utilized the
doctrine as a complete bar within the structure of comparative
negligence by holding that a plaintiff who confronts an open danger is
automatically more negligent than the defendant.56 Finally, sometimes
courts refused to apply the doctrine as a complete bar to recovery, and
open and obvious dangers became mere elements in the apportionment
of negligence.'57
When the courts first treated the open and obvious danger doctrine
as an absolute bar to recovery, the courts analyzed the doctrine in terms
of "duty," saying that a "defendant had no duty to warn or otherwise
protect" a plaintiff who chooses to act in the face of an obvious
danger.58 The absence of a duty on a defendant's part prohibited
comparison of the defendant's negligence with the plaintiff's negligence,
so integral in the comparative negligence scheme, because a defendant
must first have a "duty of care" in order to be found negligent.'59
152- See, e.g., Ceplina v. S. Milwaukee School Board, 243 N.W.2d 183 (Wis. 1976) (sports
negligence claim); Wagner v. Wis. Mun. Mut. Ins. Co., 601 N.W.2d 856 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999)
(claim against state); Kloes v. Eau Claire Cavalier Baseball Ass'n, Inc., 487 N.W.2d 77 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1992) (sports negligence claim).
153. See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
154. See Hertelendy v. Agway Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
155. See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
158. Hertelendy, 501 N.W.2d at 906. See, e.g., Scheeler v. Bahr, 164 N.W.2d 310 (Wis.
1969).
159. Rockweit v. Senecal, 541 N.W.2d 742, 747 (Wis. 1995). The general rule in
Wisconsin is:
In order to maintain a cause of action for negligence in this state, there must exist:
(1) A duty of care on the part of the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal
connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) an actual loss or damage as
a result of the injury.
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However, the general rule in Wisconsin is that every person has a duty
"of due care to refrain from any act which will cause foreseeable harm
to others. "60 Cases in Wisconsin that have analyzed duty based upon
the nature of the relationship between a plaintiff and defendant have
been deemed to be incorrect.161  In Wisconsin, negligence is not
dependent on relationships, but rather negligence is defined as conduct
that creates a foreseeable, unreasonable risk to the world at large.'62
Since the "no duty" analysis frustrates comparative negligence
principles and contradicts the general rule that everyone owes a duty of
reasonable care to the world, the Wisconsin court of appeals began to
alter open and obvious danger analysis in order to conform with
Wisconsin's general tort law principles. As a result, courts shifted from
"no duty" analysis to an application of the open and obvious danger
doctrine tailored to the needs of comparative negligence.
Under comparative negligence, the court of appeals has interpreted
the open and obvious danger doctrine to be "tantamount to a
determination that the plaintiff's negligence exceeds the defendant's
negligence as a matter of law."163  Upon such a finding, contributory
negligence bars recovery.' 6  This interpretation is consistent with
comparative negligence principles on the surface, but it clearly ignores a
defendant's conduct and focuses solely on the conduct of the plaintiff. 161
Id. (emphasis added).
160. A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 214 N.W.2d 764,766 (Wis. 1974).
161. Some Wisconsin cases have followed the rule proclaimed in section 314 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts that a person has no duty to take affirmative action to help or
protect another person unless a special relationship exists. In Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI
68, 611 N.W.2d 906, the supreme court stated that limiting liability in terms of duty "is
incorrect under Wisconsin law." Id. 1 24 n.4, 611 N.W.2d at 913 n.4. Instead, "failure to take
an affirmative action may constitute negligence when it is inconsistent with the duty to
exercise ordinary care." Id. 23, 611 N.W.2d at 913. Basically, "the crucial question ... is
not whether [a person] had any 'duty' to take affirmative actions but whether [a person's]
alleged failure to take certain actions was consistent with his duty to exercise a reasonable
degree of care." Id. 25, 611 N.W.2d at 913.
162. Morgan v. Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 660, 665 (Wis. 1979). Wisconsin follows
the minority view of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). A.E.
Investment Corp., 214 N.W.2d at 766. See also Charles F. Grumley, Comment, Limitation of
Liability in Wisconsin Negligence Actions, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 585 (1965-66).
163. Wagner v. Wis. Mun. Mut. Ins. Co., 601 N.W.2d 856, 859 (Wis. 1999). See also
Hertelendy, 501 N.W.2d at 908; Kloes v. Eau Claire Cavalier Baseball Ass'n, Inc., 487 N.W.2d
77, 81 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992); Wisnicky v. Fox Hills Inn & Country Club, Inc., 473 N.W.2d 523,
524 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
164. Kloes, 487 N.W.2d at 81. See also supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
165. Wisnicky illustrates that no comparison needs to be made. In Wisnicky, the safe
place statute, section 101.11 of the Wisconsin Statutes, imposed the standard of care upon the
defendant. Wisnicky, 473 N.W.2d at 524. The standard of care owed under the safe place
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For example, courts have held that diving into waters of unknown depth
is an open and obvious danger as a matter of law."s  Under this
interpretation, if a plaintiff were to dive into water of unknown depth,
thereby confronting an open danger, the plaintiff's negligence would be
necessarily greater than the landowner's as a matter of law. There is no
discussion of the defendant's actions in the analysis, and the landowner
would be free from liability even if his or her actions created a
foreseeable risk of harm. A landowner could place a diving board at the
end of a pier that extended one hundred feet from the shoreline and
would be immune from liability even if the landowner knew there were
cement blocks lying a foot below the water's surface. Once a plaintiff
confronted the obvious danger (diving into water of unknown depth),
the plaintiff's action would immunize any wrongdoing of the defendant.
Examination of only one party's negligence is certainly not consistent
with comparative negligence principles.
Regardless of which application controls the open and obvious
danger doctrine, Wisconsin courts in the 1990s were reluctant to use the
doctrine as a complete bar. One decision acknowledged the doctrine's
power to bar claims, then ruled that it only applies "where there is a
high degree of probability that the condition or danger confronted will
result in harm." 67 Generally, courts imposed the doctrine as an absolute
bar only in premises or products liability cases.'6 For "ordinary
negligence cases," the doctrine "should not be used to resolve liability
issues.., even where the plaintiff engaged in conduct that would be
foreseen as subjecting a party to a high risk of injury., 169 Instead, the
openness and the obviousness of a danger are used as elements when
apportioning negligence."'
2. Supreme Court of Wisconsin Decisions and Theory
The open and obvious danger doctrine only has acted as an outright
bar to a plaintiff's recovery in situations in which the "special legal
statute is higher than that of ordinary care, but the court had no problem applying Griebler, a
landowner ordinary care case, to bar the claim. Id. at 525. The court reasoned that "[tihe
expectation that the pool will be of sufficient depth everywhere is unreasonable under any
standard of care." Id.
166. See Griebler v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 897 (Wis. 1991).
167. Kloes, 487 N.W.2d at 81 (stating that playing baseball in inadequate light is not a
"danger that presents a high degree of probability of harm so as to constitute an open and
obvious danger").
168. See Hertelendy, 501 N.W.2d at 907-08.
169. Wagner v. Wis. Mun. Mut. Ins. Co., 601 N.W.2d 856,860 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
170. See Hertelendy, 501 N.W.2d at 907.
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relationships" exist of landowner-invitee and manufacturer-consumer . 71
The court of appeals has reasoned that the open and obvious danger
doctrine has been limited to those situations because there is "'a strong
public policy.., to justify such a direct abrogation of comparative
negligence principles.'"'7' Analysis of supreme court cases suggests that
the possible public policy reasons for applying the open and obvious
danger doctrine as an absolute defense to premises and products liability
cases may be antiquated.
a. Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski and Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Insurance Co. of
America
One of Wisconsin's earliest cases that challenged the application of
the open and obvious danger doctrine as an absolute bar to recovery
was Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski.'" As discussed above, the notion that a
landowner may not be liable for injuries resulting from open and
obvious dangers originated during a time when there was a distinction
between licensees and invitees.74 A landowner generally owed a less
stringent duty to a licensee than it did to an invitee on the premises;1.
however, the supreme court in Antoniewicz abolished any distinction
between duties owed to those who entered upon one's property.'76 The
supreme court reasoned that "[t]here is no reason why one who invites a
guest to a party at his home should have less concern for that guest's
safety than he has for the welfare of an insurance man who may come to
the home to deliver a policy. '" As a result, the court held that "[t]he
duty toward all persons who come upon property with the consent of the
occupier will be that of ordinary care .... [N]egligence is to be
determined by ascertaining whether the defendant's exercise of care
171. See id. at 907 ("Wisconsin courts have repeatedly refused to apply the open and
obvious danger doctrine to absolve defendants of any duty to warn plaintiffs of hazards where
the landowner-invitee or manufacturer-consumer relationship was absent.").
172. See Wagner, 601 N.W.2d at 859 (emphasis omitted).
173. 236 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1975).
174. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 343A (1965).
175. See supra Part III.A.l.a. See also Antoniewicz, 236 N.W.2d at 4.
176. Antoniewicz, 236 N.W.2d at 11. The court did not abolish the distinction between
those on the premises with consent and those who are trespassers. Id. at 4 ("[W]e conclude
that the distinction is so great between th[e] legal status [of trespassers] and that of the
licensee-invitee that we ought not consider now the abrogation of the rule in regard to
trespassers.").
177. Id. at 10.
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foreseeably created an unreasonable risk to others. "78
A reasonable argument can be made that Antoniewicz should not
affect the application of the open and obvious danger doctrine. The
duty owed to an invitee prior to Antoniewicz was "that of ordinary care
under the circumstances."'79  Since Antoniewicz held that the duty
toward all who enter upon property is that of "ordinary care," it can be
argued that the court merely abolished landowner immunity in relation
to licensees but did not alter any law regarding landowners' duty toward
invitees.' Prior to Antoniewicz, the duty of ordinary care owed to an
invitee did not require landowners to protect or warn invitees of open
dangers.' Therefore, if Antoniewicz merely increased the standard of
care toward licensees to the same standard of care owed to invitees,
then landowners would remain immune from liability related to open
dangers upon their premises. However, there is much discussion in
Antoniewicz to suggest that the court did more than just increase the
duty owed to licensees to the same level as that owed to invitees.
First, language in Antoniewicz contradicts the argument that the
duty of ordinary care previously owed to invitees is the same as the duty
of ordinary care newly imposed by the Antoniewicz decision. In express
language, the court "abolish[ed] the special immunities that heretofore
applied to licensees and invitees. ""' Thus, the duty of "ordinary care
under the circumstance" previously owed to an invitee necessarily
possessed "special immunities" apart from other negligence cases."
The court did not announce that the newly imposed standard of
ordinary care is that which had originally applied to invitees; rather the
court stated that "[b]y such standard of ordinary care, we mean the
standard that is used in all other negligence cases in Wisconsin. '' 1
178. Id. at 11.
179. E.g., id. at 4.
180. Justice Robert Hansen's dissenting opinion expressed this view. Justice Hansen
interpreted the majority decision as abolishing the distinction between licensee and invitee
and imposing "not the lower duty owed to a [licensee], but the broader duty, heretofore owed
only to business invitees." Id. at 13 (R. Hansen, J., dissenting).
181. See supra notes 98, 108-124 and accompanying text.
182. Antoniewicz, 236 N.W.2d at 11 (emphasis added).
183. In A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 214 N.W.2d 764 (Wis. 1974), the
supreme court noted that landowner cases "are concerned with special types of legal
relationships [and] are out of the mainstream of negligence law in Wisconsin.... Unless the
landowner, by his conduct, places himself within an exception of the common law, he has an
immunity from liability for negligence to one who comes upon his land." Id. at 767-68.
184. Antoniewicz, 236 N.W.2d at 11. The supreme court has stated that Antoniewicz
imposes upon a landowner the same duty of care as found in the ordinary negligence case.
Shannon v. Shannon, 442 N.W.2d 25,30 & n.2 (Wis. 1989).
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Additionally, the court in a footnote specifically rejected the argument
that its decision merely "merged" landowners' duty toward licensees
with the higher standard of care owed to invitees."'
Second, once it is clear that the newly imposed duty of ordinary care
is separate from the duty originally owed to invitees, it is evident that
the court preferred comparative negligence principles rather than
discussion of limited duty. For example, the court analogized to the
McConville'8 decision, which abrogated assumption of risk in
automobile guest cases,' and determined that comparative negligence
principles are capable of handling landowner cases." The court stated
that "both the occupier of land and one who comes upon it are charged
with the duty of ordinary care, and even though the owner be found
negligent, his liability may well be reduced by the negligence of the
plaintiff under the familiar principles of our comparative-negligencelaw. " "9
Further, the court gave a concise example of the intended effect of
the newly imposed ordinary care standard by comparing it with the
reasoning of Scheeler v. Bahr,'90 an open and obvious danger case."'
According to the court,
[u]nder the licensor-licensee, invitor-invitee rationale heretofore
prevailing, were there a legal finding that there was no violation
of duty of any kind to the entrant on the property, the question
of contributory negligence did not arise... Under the ordinary-
care standard, which we hold to be applicable to the occupier of
land, a duty of ordinary care falls also upon the entrant, and his
negligence must be considered by the jury as in any other
negligence case. ' 9
Therefore, under the old "no duty" reasoning, contributory
negligence analysis was irrelevant because the landowner violated no
duty, but under the new standard, contributory negligence is paramount
185. Id. at 12 n.5 ("The result of what the court does is not a merger of the licensee or
invitee categories but the abolition of them as relevant legal distinctions. No category of
licensee-invitee is created .... Ordinary tort law applies.").
186. See McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 113 N.W.2d 14 (Wis. 1962).
187. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
188. Antoniewicz, 236 N.W.2d at 10.
189. Id.
190. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
191. Antoniewicz, 236 N.W.2d at 11-12.
192. Id. (citations omitted)
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because it acts as an appropriate safeguard for defendants by reducing
or even barring plaintiffs' recovery.193 The effect of Antoniewicz is that
landowner "special immunities" are destroyed and landowner liability is
placed within the context of ordinary negligence. 4
The language of Antoniewicz, like the passage of the comparative
negligence statute and the abrogation of assumption of risk, stresses the
comparative negligence principles such as allowing the jury to apportion
negligence. These principles are corroborated in Pagelsdorf v. Safeco
Insurance Co. of America."'5
In Pagelsdorf, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin utilized negligence
principles when it analyzed liability in landlord-tenant situations.'#
Prior to Pagelsdorf, landlords had no duty to maintain their premises
with ordinary care to avoid injury to tenants or tenants' visitors.' 9 The
basis for this traditional rule was that a landlord transfers possession and
control over the property to the tenant upon conveyance of the lease.98
Therefore, the court again faced a situation in which landowners were
protected due to their relationship with the injured person 99 Similar to
Antoniewicz, the court eliminated the general rule of landlord immunity
and instead mandated that landlords must maintain their premises
within a standard of ordinary care. "
At trial, the court applied the landowner-licensee jury instruction
because the events of the case occurred before Antoniewicz abolished
the distinctions between duties owed to a licensee as opposed to an
invitee.2 The supreme court recognized that the traditional landlord
193. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
194. Antoniewicz, 263 N.W.2d at 11. This duty of ordinary care that Antoniewicz
imposes upon a landowner is the same duty of care as found in the ordinary negligence case.
Shannon v. Shannon, 442 N.W.2d 25,30 & n.2 (Wis. 1989).
195. 284 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 1979).
196. See id. at 59. The plaintiff in Pagelsdorf was injured when he fell through a railing
and off of a porch that was located on the defendant's property. Id. at 57. The defendant had
leased the property, and the plaintiff was a visitor of the tenant. Id. at 56-57.
197. Id. at 58. There were some exceptions to this rule. Id. at 59. First, a landlord was
liable to a tenant or visitor if the landlord contracted to repair the defect by which a tenant or
visitor was injured. Id. Second, a landlord was liable for injury caused by a defect that the
landlord knowingly concealed. Id. Third, leases for public use mandated ordinary care from
a landlord. Id.
198. Id. at 58-59.
199. The holding in Antoniewicz, that landowners have a duty of ordinary care to all
who enter their property, did not control this case because the events occurred prior to the
Antoniewicz decision. See id. at 58.
200. See id. at 59.
201. See id. at 57-58. Prior to Antoniewicz, a landowner was liable to a licensee only if
2000]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
immunity rule would generally warrant such a jury instruction, but the
court insisted that public policy required the abolishment of the ancient
landowner immunity established in the "dark ages" of "agrarian
England. '2 °c The court reasoned that "[w]hatever justification the rule
might once have had, there no longer seemed to be any reason to except
landlords from a general duty of exercising ordinary care to prevent
foreseeable harm. 203  In yet another example of the supreme court
utilizing comparative negligence principles, the court stated that
negligence principles now determine landlord liability.' Any evidence
of obvious dangers should be examined as elements in the
determination of negligence.0 5
Interestingly, the decisions of Antoniewicz and Pagelsdorf did not
put an end to the use of the open and obvious danger doctrine as an
absolute bar to a plaintiff's recovery. Despite the supreme court's
strong language ordering that landowners have a duty of reasonable
care to all who enter upon their premises, the court of appeals continued
to give the open and obvious danger doctrine force2" by agreeing that
Antoniewicz did not "abolish[] all former Wisconsin case law involving
the open and obvious danger exception to ordinary negligence. "2
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin first noted the apparent "split of
authority" in Shannon v. Shannon.m The court referred to its language
from Pagelsdorf that stated that landowners owe a duty of ordinary care
to anyone on their premises and that obvious dangers and defects are
"relevant only insofar as they bear on the ultimate question: Did the
the landowner failed to warn the licensee of hidden dangers, otherwise known as "traps." See
id. at 58.
202, See id. at 59.
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. See id. ("Accordingly, a landlord's conduct should be appraised according to
negligence principles. Questions of control, hidden defects, and common use would be
relevant only as bearing on the general determination of negligence, including foreseeability
and unreasonableness of the risk of harm.").
206. See Davenport v. Gillmore, 431 N.W.2d 701, 705 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) ("Although
Antoniewicz abrogated the distinction between licensees and invitees, we still recognize the
open and obvious danger exception to the duty of ordinary care."); Waters v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 369 N.W.2d 755, 758-59 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) ("We conclude that prior to
Antoniewicz there was no obligation to protect the invitee against open and obvious dangers
that the invitee may reasonably be expected to discover and that post-Antoniewicz this rule
remains the same."); Maci v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 314 N.W.2d 914, 918 (Wis. Ct. App.
1981) ("We conclude that Antoniewicz and Pagelsdorf did not abrogate the 'warning/open
and obvious' limitations on liability.").
207. Waters, 369 N.W.2d at 756.
208. 442 N.W.2d 25 (Wis. 1989).
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landlord exercise ordinary care in the maintenance of the premises
under all the circumstances?"' j However, the court appeared to be
confused that the court of appeals had not interpreted this language as
putting an end to the landowner open and obvious danger doctrine.
21 1
Nevertheless, the court chose not to directly reconcile the apparent split
because the parties in Shannon had not briefed the issue.
21
'
b. Griebler v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc.
However, in 1991, the supreme court in Griebler v. Doughboy
Recreational, Inc."' appeared to accept the validity of the open and
obvious danger absolute defense once again. Following the reasoning of
a pre-Antoniewicz case, Scheeler v. Bahr,3 the court concluded that the
act of diving into water of an unknown depth was an "open and obvious
danger as a matter of law."214 The court clearly utilized the doctrine as
an absolute bar when it dismissed the plaintiff's entire case and held that
"the open and obvious danger defense applies whenever a plaintiff
voluntarily confronts an open and obvious condition and a reasonable
person in the position of the plaintiff would recognize the condition and
the risk the condition presents."25
c. Rockweit v. Senecal
Finally, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin addressed the application
of the open and obvious danger doctrine in Rockweit v. Senecal,21 6 but
unfortunately the court's language was not strong enough to
immediately put any questions about the doctrine to rest. The plaintiff
in Rockweit, an eighteen-month-old child, fell into a fire pit at the
campground where his family was staying.217 The defendant, a camper
who neglected to extinguish the hot embers of the fire,218 argued that she
209. Id. at 31 (quoting Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 284 N.W.2d 55, 61 (Wis.
1979)).
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. 466 N.W.2d 897 (Wis. 1991).
213. 164 N.W.2d 310, 313 (Wis. 1969) (holding that "the plaintiff must be held to
knowledge and appreciation of the risk likely to be encountered by plunging head first into
the unplumbed depths of the murky lake").
214. Griebler, 466 N.W.2d at 898-99.
215. Id. at 898 (footnote omitted). However, Griebler does not affect the Maci
exception or instances in which a person is likely to be distracted. Id. at 898 n.1.
216. 541 N.W.2d 742 (Wis. 1995).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 744.
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had no duty to remedy the situation because the fire was an open and
obvious danger."9
The court of appeals analyzed the different applications of the open
and obvious danger doctrine at length." According to the court of
appeals, the doctrine acts as a complete bar to recovery in cases in which
landowner-invitee or manufacturer-consumer relationships exist; in
these situations, the defense acts as a complete bar because the
defendant is absolved of any duty to the plaintiff."' On the other hand,
the second application is based on comparative negligence principles
and is utilized in ordinary negligence cases.m Negligence is weighed as
"a matter of law" and the open and obvious danger defense acts as a bar
to recovery in accordance with the comparative negligence statute.W
After all the discussion about the application of the open and
obvious doctrine by the court of appeals, the supreme court decided
Rockweit on public policy grounds rather than utilizing the open and
obvious danger doctrine." Nevertheless, the court took the opportunity
to address the doctrine because of "the apparent conflict of authority
among the court of appeals."
21
The first thing the court did was "expressly reaffirm [its] prior
holding in Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. that a landlord owes his or her
tenant or anyone else on his or her premises a duty to exercise ordinary
care .... '[N]otice of the defect, its obviousness.., are all relevant only
insofar as they bear on'" the determination of whether landlords
maintained their premises using ordinary care.2 The supreme court
further stated,
219. Id. at 748. The plaintiff responded by arguing that the defendant could not utilize
the open and obvious danger doctrine as an absolute bar because the defendant "lacked the
requisite 'owner' or 'possessor' status." Id.
220. See Rockweit v. Senecal, 522 N.W.2d 575 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 541 N.W.2d
742 (Wis. 1995).
221. See id. at 580 ("This meaning of the open and obvious danger doctrine-that the
defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff-is limited to those situations involving a landowner's
duty to invitees or other special legal relationships, such as the manufacturer-consumer
relationship."). This application of the defense could not be utilized because Rockweit
involved campers who all "had the same relationship to one another." Id. at 581.
222. See id. at 581.
223. Id. The court did not use this application of the defense because a comparison of
negligence was not possible because in Wisconsin a child under the age of seven cannot be
found negligent. See id.
224. Rockweit v. Senecal, 541 N.W.2d 742,748-51 (Wis. 1995).
225. Id. at 748.
226. Id. (citation omitted).
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Our decisions in Pagelsdorf and Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski
abrogated the common law immunity by subsuming the concept
of open and obvious danger into the consideration of common
law negligence. In the ordinary negligence case, if an open and
obvious danger is confronted by the plaintiff, it is merely an
element to be considered by the jury in apportioning negligence
and will not operate to completely bar the plaintiff's recovery.'
The language from Rockweit, although dictum, strongly implies that
the distinction made by the court of appeals was erroneous. The
supreme court reiterated that the open and obvious danger doctrine is
subsumed into common-law negligence. In common-law negligence, the
doctrine is not to be used as an absolute defense, but rather as merely
one element meriting the jury's consideration in the comparative
negligence scheme.
3. The Application of the Open and Obvious Danger Defense Since
Rockweit
Despite the supreme court's attempt to clarify the "conflict of
authority" regarding open and obvious dangers, the court of appeals has
interpreted Rockweit inconsistently. The court of appeals first noted the
conflict between Griebler and Rockweit in a 1997 products liability case,
Hansen v. New Holland North America, Inc.m According to the court,
Griebler implies that the open and obvious danger doctrine serves as an
"absolute defense" in manufacturer-consumer casese9 while Rockweit
questions that notion?2 Instead of relying on Rockweit's language to
determine the proper method for open and obvious danger analysis,
Hansen, in dicta,31 focused on the public policy argument that
227. Id. at 748-49 (citation omitted).
228. 574 N.W.2d 250,254 (Wis. 1997).
229. Id. The court stated:
The Griebler decision's reliance on the landowner-invitee line of cases together with
its holding that the open and obvious danger in that case barred recovery against the
manufacturer implied that, in products liability cases involving manufacturer-
consumer relationships, the open and obvious danger doctrine serves as an absolute
defense.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
230. See id. ("A review of a recent supreme court decision... calls into question
whether in manufacturer-consumer cases the [open and obvious danger] doctrine continues to
provide immunity, as opposed to merely being a factor in the fact-trier's apportionment of
comparative negligence.").
231. The court chose not to resolve the apparent Griebler-Rockweit conflict because the
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"[c]oncentrating only on the user's conduct ignores the manufacturer's
responsibility for producing that danger, and indeed creates an incentive
for manufacturers to ensure that hazards are in fact open and
obvious."'' 2 Since the court found it was not good policy to focus solely
on a plaintiff's conduct, the court determined that comparative
negligence principles, with the jury comparing the negligence of both
the plaintiff and the defendant manufacturer, are better suited to solve
open and obvious issues.n3
Similarly, the court of appeals decision of Wagner v. Wisconsin
Municipal Mutual Insurance Co.' implies that there are still two
different applications of the open and obvious danger doctrine. The
first application utilizes the comparative negligence statute as an
absolute bar because facing an open and obvious danger "is tantamount
to a determination that the plaintiff's negligence exceeds the
defendant's negligence as a matter of law."2" The second application is
governed by the comparative negligence principle of allowing the jury to
apportion negligence, and courts apply this use of the doctrine in
ordinary negligence cases.f6 As the cases illustrate, Rockweit did not
adequately convince Wisconsin courts that there should be only one
application of the open and obvious danger doctrine, with the
obviousness of a danger merely being an element used when
apportioning negligence.
4. Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Service, Inc.-The Supreme Court's
Latest Decision
In the supreme court's most recent discussion of the open and
obvious danger doctrine, Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Service,
Inc.' 7 the court distinguished the open and obvious danger doctrine from
issue of whether the danger was actually open and obvious had yet been answered. See id.
("[B]ecause there is an issue of fact regarding whether the circumstances presented an open
and obvious danger, it is not necessary at this point to determine whether Griebler mandates
immunity. ").
232 Id. Cf. supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (stating a similar reason for
abolishing assumption of risk in master and servant cases).
233. See Hansen, 574 N.W.2d at 254.
234. 601 N.W.2d 856 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
235. See id. at 859-60.
236. See id. at 860. Illustrative of its view that there are different applications of the rule,
the court of appeals stated, "We are addressing the 'open and obvious danger' doctrine only
as it applies to cases involving ordinary negligence." Id. at n.4.
237. 2000 WI 87, 613 N.W.2d 142. In Strasser, a crane operator slipped on a ladder
fabricated by the defendant. Id. 1, 613 N.W.2d at 145. The plaintiff sued for negligent
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use of open and obvious dangers in the determination of negligence. m
According to the court, the "doctrine operates as an affirmative defense
that allows a jury to allocate a plaintiff's contributory negligence."' 9
However, using the doctrine as an affirmative defense did not prevent
the court from analyzing open and obvious dangers in its initial
determination of negligence.24 For the failure to warn claim, the court
held that a manufacturer's standard of ordinary care is not breached by
failing to warn of dangers that consumers are expected to notice and
realize.4" Since it was reasonable for the defendant to believe the
consumer would realize the risk, the failure to warn was not
negligence.242 As for the negligent manufacturing and design claims, the
court added that, upon a finding of negligence, a jury may "consider
whether [the plaintiff] confronted an open and obvious danger in its
negligence allocation."243 It is evident from this decision that a court
analyzing failure to warn claims may consider the open and obvious
nature of a danger when determining if negligence exists. 24 Once a
defendant is held to be negligent, then a plaintiff's confrontation of an
open and obvious danger is an element properly considered in a
contributory negligence determination by the jury.
IV. WHERE DOES THE OPEN AND OBVIOUS DANGER DOCTRINE
BELONG IN WISCONSIN?
The most recent supreme court decisions discussing the open and
obvious danger doctrine have not been the model of consistency. If a
manufacturing, negligent design, and negligent failure to warn of a defect. Id. 22, 613
N.W.2d at 148. A large part of the decision involves the issue of whether the defendant was a
manufacturer of the ladder or merely a reconditioner, but this discussion is irrelevant to this
Comment.
238. See id. 60, 613 N.W.2d at 156 ("The issue of ordinary care... is distinct from the
open and obvious danger doctrine.").
239. Id. 60,613 N.W.2d at 156 (emphasis added).
240. Id. I1 60-63, 613 N.W.2d at 155-56.
241. Id. 91 58-59, 613 N.W.2d at 154-55. The court cited section 388 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which says that one who supplies chattel to another must warn of defects
only if there is "'no reason to believe' that the user 'will realize' the item's dangerous
condition." Id. 91 58, 613 N.W.2d at 155.
242. Id. 91 59,613 N.W.2d at 155.
243. Id. 91 61, 613 N.W.2d at 156.
244. Id. 91 60, 613 N.W.2d at 155 ("Strasser argues that the question whether ordinary
care required Transtech to warn him about the ladders should be presented to the jury
because whether a plaintiff confronted an 'open and obvious danger' is an element to be
considered by the factfinder in apportioning negligence and will not entirely preclude the
plaintiff's recovery. We disagree.") (citation omitted).
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court were to follow Rockweit's broad proclamation, open and obvious
dangers would "merely" be an element a jury could consider in its
apportionment of negligence.2 45 However, this cannot represent the sole
use of the doctrine because the supreme court in Strasser further
analyzed open and obvious dangers within its discussion of duty and
negligence as a matter of law.24' After reviewing Wisconsin case law and
the principles behind comparative negligence, it is evident that the open
and obvious danger doctrine does not act as an absolute bar for ordinary
negligence, premises liability, and claims against manufacturers based
upon negligence rather than strict liability. However, it is likely that
open and obvious dangers will continue to bar strict products liability
claims and claims based upon a failure to warn.
A. Premises Liability
The reason why Rockweit controls landowner cases is simple: the
court relied on Antoniewicz and Pagelsdorf, both premises liability
cases, for the idea that the open and obvious danger doctrine has been
incorporated into ordinary negligence consideration.247 Since Rockweit
expressly cited the landowner and landlord cases, it is practically
unquestionable that the court intended to abrogate the open and
obvious danger doctrine as a complete defense in premises liability
cases.
248
Additionally, the idea of limited duty or immunity based upon open
and obvious dangers does not comport with the traditional concepts of
negligence law in Wisconsin. As stated above, people in Wisconsin have
a duty of ordinary care to all people they encounter, and comparative
negligence principles are designed to appropriately manage breaches of
such care.2 49 An injured person does not gain an undue advantage for
his or her own negligence because the contributory negligence defense
decreases any award in proportion to the injured person's negligence.'
Analyzing liability in terms of duty is likely to render the comparative
negligence statute useless because a jury is unable to apportion any
liability to a party who owes no duty of reasonable care."s Likewise, if a
245. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
246. See supra Part III.B.4.
247. See Rockweit v. Senecal, 541 N.W.2d 742,748 (Wis. 1995).
248. The court of appeals has already followed Rockweit in a premises liability case. See
Taft v. Derricks, 2000 WI App. 103, 24-25, 613 N.W.2d 190, 196-97.
249. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
251. The Court of Appeals of Utah held that the enactment of its comparative
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confrontation of an open and obvious danger is tantamount to a finding
that a plaintiff's negligence necessarily exceeds that of a defendant, then
the jury's role of apportioning negligence is threatened.
Finally, in addition to the contributory negligence defense, a
defendant is always safeguarded with the possibility that liability may be
limited on the basis of public policy. 2 In Wisconsin, public policy rather
than duty or causation limits liability when imposing liability would be
unjust or impractical. 3 Public policy issues are questions of law that are
best answered by a court after a jury has apportioned negligence.'
However, a court may limit liability before a trial when a complaint
clearly presents public policy issues and when the facts of a case are
simple25 Public policy limitations may not be the ideal way to address
landowner negligence, but the limitations can protect those cases in
negligence statute in effect abrogated the open and obvious danger doctrine as an absolute
defense. Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("We hold that by...
establishing a comparative negligence system, the Utah Legislature has by necessary
implication abolished the open and obvious danger rule as an absolute bar to an injured
guest's recovery."). The court based its decision on two grounds: "First, the open and obvious
danger rule is fundamentally incompatible with a comparative negligence scheme...." Id:
In its reasoning, the court quoted an Idaho case that stated,
[I]f the invitee's voluntary encounter with a known or obvious danger were deemed
to excuse the landowner's duty, then there would be no negligence to compare-
and, therefore, no recovery. The effect would be to resurrect contributory
negligence as an absolute bar to recovery in cases involving a land possessor's
liability to invitees.
Id. (quoting Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 671 P.2d 1112, 1119 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983)). Second,
the court held that the open and obvious danger doctrine too closely resembled assumption of
risk, which had been expressly abrogated. Id. at 1279-80.
252. See, e.g., Peters v. Menard, Inc., 589 N.W.2d 395, 406-07 (Wis. 1999); Rockweit, 541
N.W.2d at 749-51; Johnson v. Grzadzielewski, 465 N.W.2d 503,506 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
253. See Rockweit, 541 N.W.2d at 750. The public policy factors generally recognized
are the following:
(1) whether the injury is too remote from the negligence; (2) whether the injury is
wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor; (3) whether in
retrospect it appears too extraordinary that the negligence should have brought
about the harm; (4) whether allowance of recovery would place an unreasonable
burden on the negligent tortfeasor; (5) whether allowance of recovery would be too
likely to open the way to fraudulent claims; or (6) whether allowance of recovery
would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.
Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, (Wis. 1994).
254. Morgan v. Penn. Gen. Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 660, 667 (Wis. 1979) ("The court's
position is that it is generally better procedure to submit the negligence and cause-in-fact
issues to the jury before addressing the public policy issue.").
255. Bowen, 517 N.W.2d at 443 (Wis. 1994).
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which imposition of liability is unjust or not in the best interest of
society.
B. Products Liability
Strong policy reasons support the idea that manufacturers should
not be absolutely immune solely because product defects are obvious to
the average consumer. For example, manufacturers are in the best
position to make products reasonably safe.26 If a danger is obvious to
the average consumer, it is also obvious to a manufacturer. When a
manufacturer sees an obvious danger inherent in its product, it is in the
public's best interest that the manufacturer does something to remedy
the hazard. Manufacturers may try to eliminate a defect by utilizing a
safer design, or they may provide adequate protections against the
defect. If it is unreasonable to do either of those, the manufacturer
should adequately warn the consumer of the danger. By granting
immunity for obvious defects, manufacturers are not encouraged to
design and produce their products as safe as reasonably possible. On
the contrary, immunity for open and obvious dangers provides an
incentive for manufacturers to make hazards as openly dangerous as
possible. 7
Many states have rejected the open and obvious danger doctrine for
similar policy reasons.28 New York was one of the first states to
subsume the doctrine259 into comparative negligence analysis, and the
256. See Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55,58 (Wis. 1967).
257. The court of appeals accepted this argument in dicta in Hansen v. New Holland
North America, Inc., 574 N.W.2d 250, 254 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). The court agreed that the
open and obvious danger doctrine is best applied by the jury when apportioning negligence.
Id. The court stated,
We agree with the Hansens' contention that focusing solely on the user's conduct
will frustrate public policy considerations underlying product liability law. A danger
that is open and obvious to a consumer is equally apparent to the manufacturer.
Concentrating only on the user's conduct ignores the manufacturer's responsibility
for producing that danger, and indeed creates an incentive for manufacturers to
ensure that hazards are in fact open and obvious, possibly minimizing needed
safeguards and exposure to liability for designing dangerous products.
Id.
258. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABILITY § 2 reporters' note
IV.C (1998) ("A strong majority of courts have rejected the 'open and obvious' or 'patent
danger' rule as an absolute defense to a claim of design defect.").
259. New York referred to the doctrine as the "patent-danger doctrine." See Micallef v.
Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 578 (N.Y. 1976). A concise statement of the patent-danger
doctrine is:
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court reasoned that increasing manufacturers' responsibility promotes
the public interest.6° Florida, noting the nation's "modem trend" to
analyze the doctrine under comparative negligence, followed New
York's lead and refused to utilize the doctrine as an absolute bar
because it encourages hazardous designs and places "the entire
accidental loss on the injured plaintiff, notwithstanding the fact that the
manufacturer was partly at fault."261 Indeed, widespread criticism of the
open and obvious danger doctrine is noted in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts.
62
The Restatement (Third) of Torts analyzes design defects differently
than manufacturing defects.' According to the Restatement,
manufacturing defects disappoint a consumer's reasonable expectations
by causing a product to stray from its intended design.614  Holding
manufacturers strictly liable for manufacturing defects provides an
incentive for manufacturers to ensure that a product is being
manufactured consistent with its design.2  On the other hand, a claim
that a design is defective attacks the very standards to which products
are intended to conform.6 Instead of analyzing whether a product met
the standards imposed by its own design, courts must examine whether
the design itself was unreasonably dangerous. According to the
Restatement, the best method for determining whether a design is
unreasonably dangerous is to utilize a risk-utility test. 7
A risk-utility test is a flexible approach that weighs a product's
danger versus a product's utility.m Open and obvious dangers under
risk-utility analysis are just one of many factors a jury may consider
"If a manufacturer does everything necessary to make the machine function
properly for the purpose for which it is designed, if the machine is without any latent
defect, and if its functioning creates no danger or peril that is not known to the user,
then the manufacturer has satisfied the law's demands ...."
Id. (quoting Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950)).
260. See id. at 577 ("A casting of increased responsibility upon the manufacturer, who
stands in a superior position to recognize and cure defects, for improper conduct in the
placement of finished products into the channels of commerce furthers the public interest.").
261. Auburn Mach. Works Co., Inc. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167, 1169-71 (Fla. 1979).
262. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 reporters' note IV.C
(1998) ("Academic commentators have been almost unanimous in their criticism of the 'open
and obvious danger' rule.").
263. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a)-(b) (1998).
264. See id- § 2 cmt. a.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2,15 (Wis. 1984).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:445
when deciding if a product is unreasonably dangerous.269 This flexible
test protects the consumer by imposing a duty upon manufacturers to
make products reasonably safe, without excepting obvious dangers."0
On the other hand, the balancing test does not charge manufacturers
with the duty of creating a completely safe product.2 For example,
there may be situations in which dangers are so obvious that the
likelihood of a consumer facing such dangers is very low.2n The minimal
risk of injury weighed against factors such as the usefulness of the
product and the cost of making a product safer may result in a finding
that the product is not defective.
Unlike the majority of states, Wisconsin is committed to analyzing
strict products liability claims under the consumer-contemplation test.
Arguing that Rockweit abrogated the consumer-contemplation test is
likely to be futile because the basis of Rockweit's discussion pertained to
269. See, e.g., Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 256 n.4 (Miss. 1993)
("Having here reiterated this Court's adoption of a 'risk-utility' analysis for products liability
cases, we hold, necessarily, that the [open and obvious danger doctrine] bar is no longer
applicable in Mississippi."). Some suggested factors are:
The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole.
The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the
probable seriousness of the injury.
The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be
as unsafe.
The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product.
The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of general knowledge of the obvious condition of the product,
or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the
price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Id. at n.3 (quoting John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS.
L.J. 825 (1973)). See also Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 575-76 (N.Y. 1976).
However, Mississippi's legislature most likely condemned the "risk-utility" test when it
passed a statute that imposed liability for design defects only when "the product 'failed to
perform as expected."' Wolf v. Stanley Works, 757 So. 2d 316, 321 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)
(quoting MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(f)(11)).
270. Sperry, 617 So. 2d at 256.
271. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a.
(1998) ("Society does not benefit from products that are excessively safe-for example,
automobiles designed with maximum speeds of 20 miles per hour-any more than it benefits
from products that are too risky. Society benefits most when the right, or optimal, amount of
product safety is achieved.").
272. See Halek v. United States, 178 F.3d 481, 484-85 (7th Cir. 1999).
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the abrogation of landowner immunity, which is quite distinct from
strict-liability theory. In fact, a recent court of appeals decision applying
the consumer-contemplation test does not even allude to Rockweit's
discussion of the open and obvious danger doctrine.' Accordingly,
until the court clearly abrogates the consumer-contemplation test in
strict-liability law, manufacturers will not be liable in strict liability for
products whose defects are open and obvious.
However, the threat that manufacturers will be absolutely immune
for creating obviously dangerous products is mitigated if consumers are
allowed to bring claims for negligent manufacturing or negligent design
of products.274 As this Comment indicates, the open and obvious danger
doctrine is applicable to these negligence claims because of the Griebler
decision, not because of the consumer-contemplation test.25 In Griebler,
the supreme court improperly relied upon Vincer when it combined
strict liability analysis with negligence analysis.276 Established Wisconsin
law mandates that strict liability analysis and negligence analysis should
not be combined.2" Additionally, a majority of the discussion in
Griebler pertained to landowner open and obvious danger cases, which
have been abrogated by Rockweit.278 Since Rockweit abrogated the
landowner open and obvious danger doctrine and Griebler's reliance on
Vincer is inconsistent with Wisconsin law, there is no existing basis for
applying the open and obvious danger doctrine as an absolute bar in
products liability negligence claims. 9 Negligent design and negligent
manufacturing claims should be treated under the same "well
established rules of negligence" as found in ordinary negligence
claims tm and open and obvious dangers should be "mere[]...
element[s] to be considered by the jury in apportioning negligence and
273. See Tanner v. Shoupe, 596 N.W.2d 805, 811-12 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). The court
reiterated that a defective design claim is not unreasonably dangerous if the defect is open
and obvious to the average consumer. Id. at 812.
274. The risk-utility test "achieve[s] the same general objectives as does liability
predicated on negligence." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrs LIABILITY §
2 cmt. a (1998).
275. See supra Part III.A.2.b.
276. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
277. See Sharp v. Case Corp., 595 N.W.2d 380, 383 (1999) (reinforcing "Greiten v.
LaDow, which allows recovery for the negligent design of a product even though the product
is not even though the product is not unreasonably dangerous in a strict product liability
sense.") (citation omitted). See also supra note 150 and accompanying text.
278. See supra Part IV.A.
279. Strasser supports the proposition that these negligence claims are not barred by a
confrontation of an open and obvious danger. See supra Part III.B.4.
280. Greiten v. LaDow, 235 N.W.2d 677,684-85 (Wis. 1975).
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will not operate to completely bar the plaintiff's recovery."2'
C. Failure to Warn
The situation in which open and obvious dangers are likely to act as
a bar to a plaintiff's recovery are those claims based solely on a failure
to warn theory. As Strasser makes clear, a manufacturer is not liable
under a failure to warn theory if a product defect is open and obvious.m
The rationale behind such a rule is simple: the obvious danger acts as
sufficient warning in and of itself.m The purpose of imposing a duty to
warn in the first place is to reduce a product's or condition's risk of
injury.' If the danger and condition are so obvious that the average
person would realize the risk, warning of such danger would in no way
reduce the risk of injury.2 On the contrary, imposing a duty to warn for
all obvious dangers would likely lessen the impact of warnings
associated with truly hidden and latent defects.2 6
Consistent with prior case law developed under the theory that
landowners and manufacturers owe no duty to warn of open and
obvious dangers, liability may be imposed for failing to warn of obvious
dangers in certain situations. For example, the standard of care might
dictate that landowners have to warn of obvious dangers when situations
arise in which a person is likely to be distracted or is likely to forget that
a danger exists.8 In situations such as these, the fact that the danger
may be obvious to the reasonable undistracted person should not
prevent a claim. Rather, a rule similar to section 343A of the
281. Rockweit v. Senecal, 541 N.W.2d 742,748-49 (Wis. 1995).
282. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
283. See Carr v. San-Tan, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). If a danger is
truly open and obvious, then a warning will add nothing to an average person's knowledge
and awareness. The logic is sound enough that the legislature in Mississippi reestablished the
open and obvious danger doctrine for failure to warn actions in products liability after the
courts had abolished it. See Materials Transp. Co. v. Newman, 656 So. 2d 1199, 1203 & n.1
(Miss. 1995). See also Daniels v. Bucyrus-Erie Corp., 516 S.E.2d 848, 849 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)
("An open and obvious danger no longer bars design defect claims in Georgia, but may bar
'failure to warn' claims.") (citing Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 500 S.E.2d 570 (Ga.
1998)); Thomas V. Van Flein, Prospective Application of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability in Alaska, 17 Alaska L. Rev. 1, 46 (2000) ("While obviousness of danger
may be a defense to a failure to warn claim, it is not a recognized defense to a design claim.").
284. Puckett v. Oakfabco, Inc., 979 P.2d 1174, 1182 (Idaho 1999).
285. Id.
286. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS § 2 cmt. j (1998).
287. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (1965). See also Lovick v. Wil-Rich,
588 N.W.2d 688, 700 (Iowa 1999) (stating that there is a duty to warn of open and obvious
dangers when "harm can still be anticipated").
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Restatement (Second) of Torts is appropriate: liability may be imposed
for a failure to warn of obvious dangers when such dangers are likely to
be encountered despite such knowledge of its obviousness.
However, even if the open and obvious danger doctrine bars a
failure to warn claim, it should not necessarily bar additional negligence
claims.' In some situations, landowners or manufacturers should not
be able to avoid culpability for unreasonable dangers simply by warning
of such dangers. Instead, similar to the risk-utility test used in products
liability cases, circumstances specific to the case should determine
whether ordinary care has been breached. For example, if a simple
cover could easily eliminate dangers associated with an old-fashioned,
unused, (wishing) well, ordinary care might be breached if a landowner
merely posts a warning sign.m The fact that a warning accompanies a
danger should not necessarily make a danger reasonable." ° If a warning
disposes of liability, then the open and obvious danger doctrine would
retain its original force because an adequate warning merely makes a
danger obvious. In accord with the policy reasons behind abrogating the
open and obvious danger doctrine, a claim should not be barred if a
plaintiff can prove that the defendant acted in a manner that created an
unreasonable, foreseeable risk to the world at large.' Therefore, the
open and obvious danger doctrine may bar a failure to warn claim, but it
would not necessarily bar an accompanying negligence claim.
V. CONCLUSION
Wisconsin tort law has been gradually moving away from doctrines
that absolutely bar a plaintiff from recovery. The Legislature took a
288. Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Service, Inc., 2000 WI 87, 613 N.W.2d 142, is a
good example of a case which proceeds despite the dismissal of a failure to warn claim. The
court dismissed the failure to warn claim because the danger was apparent to the average
consumer and a warning was therefore unnecessary. Id. 57-59, 613 N.W.2d at 154-55.
However, this did not affect the negligent design and manufacturing claims. Even with an
obvious danger, the manufacturer had a duty to create the product within the standard of
care. Id. 56, 613 N.W.2d at 154.
289. Even though the deep hole in the ground is obviously dangerous, a jury could find
that a reasonable person would have covered the well to avoid the foreseeable risk of
someone falling inside.
290. See Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 824 P.2d 293,297 (N.M. 1992) ("Simply by making
hazards obvious to reasonably prudent persons, the occupier of premises cannot avoid
liability.., for injuries caused by dangers that otherwise may be made safe through
reasonable means. A risk is not made reasonable simply because it is made open and obvious
to persons exercising ordinary care.").
291. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
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large step when it passed the comparative negligence statute in 1931.29
Under the comparative negligence regime, a plaintiff's negligence
reduces an award in proportion to a plaintiff's negligence and does not
293
necessarily act as a total bar to a plaintiff's recovery.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reinforced comparative negligence
principles when it abrogated assumption of risk. 4 Some of the same
policy reasons the court used when it subsumed the assumption of risk
doctrine into comparative negligence principles apply to the open and
obvious danger doctrine.295  Namely, as the court noted about
assumption of risk in Colson,296 the open and obvious danger doctrine
detracts from the incentive to make premises and products as safe as
reasonably possible.27 A defendant should not be immune from liability
simply by creating obviously dangerous products or by allowing obvious
dangers to exist upon land. Better policy is to have all people act with
ordinary care under the circumstances to avoid foreseeable injuries.
Case specific circumstances should dictate whether a person is liable for
obvious dangers.
Additionally, common-law justifications and policy arguments that
originally supported the landowner open and obvious danger doctrine
no longer apply in Wisconsin. Typical landowners no longer possess
"vast estates" that are burdensome to maintain safely.298 Landowner
special immunities pertaining to duties owed to licensees and invitees
have been destroyed, and landowners now have a duty to use reasonable
29Z See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
293. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1999).
294. See supra Part II.B.
295. An argument can be made that the main difference between assumption of risk and
the open and obvious danger doctrine is merely semantics. Compare Griebler v. Doughboy
Recreational, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 897, 898 (Wis. 1991) (" [T]he open and obvious danger defense
applies whenever a plaintiff voluntarily confronts an open and obvious condition and a
reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff would recognize the condition and the risk
the condition presents.") (footnote omitted), with McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 113 N.W.2d 14, 16 (Wis. 1962) ("[I]njured party has assumed the risk of the particular
conduct... [by its] willingness to proceed in the face of a hazard to his safety, known and
appreciated by him."). See also Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275, 1279-80 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) ("It would defy rationality to maintain the open and obvious danger rule as a complete
bar to recovery where the essentially indistinguishable assumption of risk doctrine no longer
compels such a result.").
296. Colson v. Rule, 113 N.W.2d 21, 22 (Wis. 1962). See supra notes 72-74 and
accompanying text.
297. See Hansen v. New Holland N. Am., Inc., 574 N.W.2d 250, 254 (Wis. Ct. App.
1997).
298. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
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care when maintaining their premises.?9 With this duty or ordinary care,
premises liability claims are governed by Wisconsin's general negligence
analysis in which people are negligent when their actions or inaction
cause an unreasonable risk of harm. Prior cases that discuss
landowner's limited duties are no longer consistent with Wisconsin tort
law.
Finally, the supreme court decisions allow for a fair evaluation of the
law. Following the supreme court's broad proclamation in Rockweit and
its discussion in Strasser, the open and obvious danger doctrine acts as a
complete bar only in strict products liability cases and cases based upon
a failure to warn. As for ordinary negligence cases, which include
landowner cases and products liability negligence cases, open and
obvious dangers should merely be elements that can be considered when
apportioning negligence and should not act as an absolute bar to
recovery.
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299. See Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 326 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Wis. 1975).
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